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SOUTHEASTERN Timely 
COMMUNITY ~ ~ /_u 4-e_ (with 
COLLEGE L ~~~ ... ~ extension) 
~ / ~~ v. . 
Cert to CA 4 
DAVIS (Denied (Hall, Haynsworth 
entrance to & Butzner) 
R.N. program)"'i'J Federal/Civil · 
r<!/Jv. ~ -~4~ ~ ~ ~ 
1. SUMMARY: This case 1;aises several . s~ b~t f .:1 ~~: l _ 
issues relatfri' tot inte e~ s~ i~ . >~ d-~:_....1.- _ _, 
the Rehabilitation Act -of ~ 9 U.S.C. § 794, including: 
(a) whether it creates an implied private right of action 
for handicapped individuals to enforce rights guaranteed by 





it; and (b} whether it precludes consideration of an 
individual's handicap, even if it affects job ability, 
in admission decisions for federally-funded college 
training programs. 
2. FACTS: Respondent, a licensed practical 
nurse, sought admission to petr's Associate Degree Nursing 
Program, which trains students to be registered nurses. 
Part of the admission process is an interview. During 
respondent's interview_ it came out that she had a serious -
hearing problem. The College referred her to an independent ---------audiologist, who examined her and concluded that the impair---=--
ment was "severe" resulting in "remarkable difficu ty" in 
~
understanding speech. The audiologist did think that the 
problem could be ameliorated somewhat with a better hearing 
aid, but concluded that even with a better hearing aid 
respondent "can only be responsible for speech spoken to her, 
when the talker gets her attention and allows her to look di-
rectly at the talker [so- read]." Petn. at 6. 
The College submitted the report to the Executive 
Director of the North Carolina Board of Nursing and requested 
an advisory opinion on respondent's eligibility for licensing 
as an R.N. The Director issued an opinion stating, inter alia, 
that 
''Mrs. Davis's hearing disability can 
preclude her being safe for practice in 
any setting allowed by a license as an 






innumerable patient care situations 
in which this lady's abilities as 
defined in [the audiologist's report] •- .~,L,.~ .__I~, 
would be inadequate for her prob.ab.Ly- /WT~ 
-to identify all of the patient's needs 
for which she would be accountable or 
even to pick up some clues to situations 
that could be quite critical to the 
point of life, death, situaticns •.•• 
We would urge the college in counseling 
Mrs. Davis to alter her career goal, as 
7 
we do not believe, on the basis of facts 
we have now, that Mrs. Davis would either 
be safe for herself, or for patients, or 





Petn. at 9o The Director did not say that a license would 
be denied but hinted broadly that that would be the probable 
1/ 
outcome , 
The College denied admission to respondent. She 
~
requested reconsideration, and a committee re-r~viewed her 
application and denied it again. Respondent then filed the 
present action against the College claiming: (a) that the 
College had denied her equal protection and due - process under 
the Fourteenth Amendment and§ 1983; (b) that the College had 
discriminated against her in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 794. 
The latter provision, which is section 504 of the -
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, provides that: 
1/ 
"No ot_herwise s ualif ied handicapped 
individua l i n t fie United States, as 
de:Einecti.n section 706 (6) of this title, 
Respondent was already licensed by the Board at that time as 
a practical nurse, and it appears that the Director was not aware 
of this fact. The trial court found, however, that a LPN ' 1opera t es 
under constant supervision and is not allowed to perform me dical 
tasks which require a great degree of technical sophistication." 







shall, solely by reason of his handicap, 
be excluded from participation in, or be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected 
to discrimination under any program or 
activity receivi,ng Fed~rtl_i.inancial 
assistance.'' 
The district court summarized respondent's claim as follows: 
"Plaintiff contends, q ui.te simply, that by violating 29 U .S .C. 
§ 794, defendant has denied her rights -guaranteed under the 
'law of the United States,' thus giving rise to a cause of 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." The court assumed that 
respondent had stated a proper cause of action and that subject 
matter jurisdiction existed over it, as well as the constitu-
tional claim, under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). Proceeding to the 
merits, the court first found that, as a matter of fact, the 
College denied admission to respondent because of the College's 
judgment that her handicap made her not qualified or suitable 
2/ 
for the R.N. program. - With respect to the Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process claims, the court 
found no basis for reliefo Admission to the program is a 
privilege, not a property right, so Due Process was not im-. 
plicated. Denial of admission was not arbitrary and capricious; 
therefore, no Equal Protection violation occurred. 
2/ 
- The court found that the major factor in this judgment was 
respondent's "projected in.ability to be licensed as a Registered 
Nurse after graduation." The court also noted that "it appears 
that it would be difficult and, in fact, dangerous for plaintiff 
to even attempt the clinical portion of the training program. " 






Turning to the 29 U.S.C. § 794 claim, the court 
found that respondent qualifies as a "handicapped person" 
under the statute. Nevertheless, the court found that no 
I> -~. 
violation had occurred. The court read the language, "[n]o 
" otherwise qualified handicapped person" shall be excluded 
from programs "solely by reason of his handicap," in§ 794 
to mean that no person could be excluded solely for a handicap 
unless the nature of the handicap made the person not "other-
wise qualified." The court concluded: 
"By way of an illustration, under this 
action it would most probably be im-
permissible to exclude a deaf or blind 
person from admission to a law school, 
if academically qualified. 1Iowever, 
reason dictates that it would be entirely 
permissible to exclude a person without 
sight from a position as a truck driver 
or to refuse a person who must read lips 
to a position as a telephone operator. 
Otherwise qualified, can only be read to 
mean otherwise able to function suf-
ficiently in the position sought in spite 
of the handicap, if proper training and 
facilities are suitable and available." 
L)- c__ 
~ 
Peto. at 20a. 
The CA 4 affirmed in part and reversed in part. It ----~ -- ... _ - --
began by agreeing that respondent had a cause of action under 
§ 794. It either failed to appreciate, or implicitly dis-
31 
agreed with, the route chosen by respondent - and adopted by 
1./ /~ 
As noted above, the theory was that §_ 794_created a federal 
statut ry i t enforceable under 1 ~ I assume t hat re-
spon ents asserte t eir cause of action in this fashion in the 
pleadings because the district court purported to accept at face 
value respondent's assertion. The pleadings are not contained 





- 6 - Cll~ 
~~ 
the district court, however. The CA 4 did not even 
'---------. 
mention§ 19~3. Instead, it found that§ 794 contained ;q 2'3 
an implied ·private cause of action. In doing so, the Jf-
court "adopt[ed] the sound reasoning" of Lloyd v. Regional ~ 
Transportation Authority, 548 F o2d 1277, 1284-87 (CA 7 1977). ~J.,,::;, 
In Lloyd the CA 7 applied the four-factor test of Cort v . Ash, ~ 
~ -- -- 7)6~ 
422 U.S. 66, 78 (1974), and found: (a) handicapped persons 
are among the class specially benefited by enactment of§ 794; 
(b) while the legislative history of§ 794 is sparse, 1974 
Amendments clarified congressional intent and explicitly 
indicate that Congress intended a private cause of action; 
(c) it is consistent with the underlying purposes of the 
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy; (d) affording a 
private remedy would not infringe on concerns traditionally 
4/~ 
~ 
relegated to the states. 
c~  I 
On the merits, the CA 4 reversed the district court, - - ...-- .--,,._., holding that under§ 794 the College must consider respondent's / 
application for admission without regard to her hearing dis-
abilityo The court relied on the following HEW regulation, 
which was issued on January 3, 1977, six months after the 
district court's decision: 
4/ 
- See 4 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6390-91 (1974): "This I 
approach to implementation of section 504 [29 U.S.C. § 794] 






~ mplementing Section 504 of the 1973 
Act. May 4, 1977, 45 C.F.R . Part 84: 
§ 84.3 Definitions. 
As used in this part, the term: 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
(k) "Qualified handicapped person" means: 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
(3) With respect to postsecondary and vocational educa-
tion services, a handicapped person who meets the academic 
and technical standards requisite to admission or participa----------------tion in the recipient's education program or activity. 
The court read that regulation as requiring that only 
"technical" and "academic" criteria be used in determining 
eligibility for programs financed by federal money, ~ -
eluding consideration of the handicap itself. ---- ---- ---- ------. The CA 4 also ordered the district court to 
reconsider a claim made by respondent below but ignored 
because of the district court's ruling that the College did 
J( 
not have to admit respondent: that the College must modify 
\\ -----------its nursing program to accommodate respondent and her 
~
disability. The CA 4 read several HEW regulations as 
ing affirmative relief, "even when such modifications 
5/ 




- 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(a)o Academic requirementso 
"A recipient . a • shall make such 
modifications to its academic re-
quirements as are necessary to ensure 






Finally, because ·of its ruling on the§ 794 claim, 
the CA 4 did not reach the constitutional claims of re-
spondent. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr begins by observing that 
this is the first case to reach the Court on the meaning 
and scope of§ 794 and that the issue has great significance. 
~- ----------
Approximately 11 million people between ages 16-64, or one 
of eleven Americans, are handicapped. 
Second, petr argues that the decision below is 
irrational. There are numerous situations where it would 
be~afe and unwise to permit a handicapped individual to 
perform certain functions, whatever their academic and technical 
fno 5 continued from p. 7/ 
that such requirements do not discriminate 
or have the effect of discriminating, on 
the basis of handicap, against a qualified 
handicapped applicant or student.** Modi-
fications may include changes in the length 
of time permitted for the completion of 
degree requirements, substitution of specific 
courses required for the completion of degree 
requirements, and adaptation of the manner in 
which specific courses are conducted." 
45 C.FoRo § 84.44(d)(l). Auxiliary aids. 
•~ recipient ..• shall take such steps as 
are necessary to ensure that no handicapped 
student is denied the benefits of, excluded 
from participation in, or otherwise subjected 
to discrimination under the education program 
or activity operated by the recipient because 
of the absence of educational auxiliary aids 
for students with impaired sensory, manual, 







qualifications. As an example, petr cites a one-armed 
person who desires to become a surgeon or a blind person 
who wants to be a driver. 
Second, petr argues that the CA 4 erred in its 
interpretation of§ 794 and the HEW interpretiv~ regulations. 
Petr contends that the plain meaning of§ 794's phrase 
"otherwise qualified" is that handicaps may be taken into ac-
count where relevant. Petr also asserts that the CA 4 misreads 
the HEW regulation it relied on and cites the HEW's own official 
interpretation of that regulation, 584.3(k)(3). In the inter-
pretation, HEW explains why it deliberately omitted the word 
"otherwise," contained in the statute, from the regulation: 
Definitions - 5. "Qualified handicapped person. " paragraph 
(k) of § 84.3 defines the term "qualified handicapped per-
son." Throughout the regulation, this term is used instead 
of the statutory term "otherwise qualified handicapped per-
son." The Department believes that the omission of the 
word "otherwise" is necessary in order to comport with 
the intent of the statute because , read literally, ''otherwise" 
qualified handicapped persons include persons who are quali-
fied except for their handicap, rather than in spite of their 
handicap. Under such a literal reading, a blind person pos-
sessing all the qualifications for driving a bus except sight 
could be said to be "otherwise qualified" for the job of 
driving. Clearly , such a result was not intended -by Con-
gress. In all other respects, the terms "qualified" and 
"otherwise qualified" are in tended to be interchangeable. 
Third, petr argues that the CA 4's order to the 
district court to consider whether the College should modify 






raises a substantial issue of the degree of affirmative 
action that must be taken with respect to seriously 
handicapped persons. Petr states that neither the language 
nor legislative history of section 794 justifies any such 
requirements. Moreover, the result would be undesirable. 
It would mean that either (a) the College would be forced 
to modify its programs at great expense to train individuals, 
no matter how handicapped, to perform functions that it is 
dangerous and undesirable for them to perform; or (b) colleges 
would have to modify its programs at great expense to train 
them to the limits of their abilities, i.~., to be able to 
perform all of the occupational functions that the handicapped 
individual possibly could perform. 
Fourth, petr argues that the important question of 
whether§ 794 creates a private right of action ought to be 
decided by the Court. Petr concedes that every court that has 
considered the issue has agreed with the CA 4 and CA 7, see 
petn. at 22, but argues that the issue needs to be reconsidered. 
Petr contends that the CA 7 itself, by implication, has reopened 
the issue. That is because in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 
559 F.2d 1063 (1977), cert. granted, July 3, 1978 (No. 77-926), 
the CA 7 ruled that Title IX contains no private right of action, 
rejecting the applicability of Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 
(1974), a case relied on in Lloyd. Petr concedes that the leg-
islative history of§ 794 (see note 4, supra) suggests the 







right exists it should come into existence only after 
HEW has implemented a full compliance program with an 
administrative enforcement mechanism that must be exhausted 
6/ 
first. -
The response basically relies on the reasoning of 
the CA 4. On the issue of whether a private right of action 
exists under§ 794, however, it provides an important addi-
tion. On November 6, 1978, the President signed into law the 
Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental 
Disabilities Amendments of 1978, P.L. 95-602. The Amendments 
expressly indicate that Congress, at least, thinks that a 
private right of action exists under§ 794 because they provide 
for attorney's fees for the prevailing party. The Senate Com-
mittee Report accompanying the Amendments states: 
6/ 
- Petr also notes that in Lloyd the CA 7 declared in a 
footnote: 
"We expressly leave open as premature 
the question whether, after consolidated 
procedural enforcement regulations are 
issued to implement Section 504, the ju-
dicial remedy available must be limited to 
post-administrative remedy judicial review. 
••• And until effective enforcement regu-
lations are promulgated, Section 504 in its 
present incarnation as an independent cause 
of action should not be subjugated to the 
do~gine of exhaustion .•.• But assuming a 
meaningful administrative enforcement mech-
anism, the private cause of action under 
Section 504 should be limited to~ posteriori 
judicial review." 






"The committee believes that the 
rights extended to handicapped in-
dividuals under Title V .•• are, 
and will remain, in need of vigilance 
by handicapped individuals to assure 
compliance, and in vindicating private 
rights of action in the case of Sec-
tion 503 cases, as well as those arising 
under Section 501 and 504. S. REP. NO. 
95-890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1978) 
(Emphasis added). See also, 124 CONG. 
REC. S.15590-S.15593 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 
1978) (remarks of Sens. Cranston and 
Bayh). 
The response also notes that in Bakke, 98 SaCt. 2814-15, 
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS (who was joined by JUSTICES REHNQUIST and 
STEWART, and THE CHIEF JUSTICE) cited§ 794 as an example of 
legislation which "Congress has repeatedly enacted • a . 
predicated on the assumption that Title VI may be enforced 
in a private actiona" 
On the issue of whether administrative remedies need 
to be exhausted before a ·private action may be filed, respondent 
notes that the CA 4 ordered the district court, on remand, to 
consider this very issue. See petn. at lla. 
On the merits, the response contends that the decision 
below was right, and that it is too narrow to warrant review. 
All the CA 4 did was order the district court to order the 
College to "reconsider" respondent's application without regard 
to her handicap and to consider the issue of affirmative relief 
for the hqndicapped, both in light of HEW's regulations. Be-






particular case," there is no significant interpretation 
7/ 
of§ 794. -
4 • . DISCUSSION: The issue of whether§ 794 
creates a private cause of action is extremely important 
because of the enormous number of potential lawsuits that - --------------- -
could be brought under it. The CA 4 appears to have decided 
the issue correctly, however. It seems evident that Congress 
intended, although it was not explicit about the matter when 
8/ 
it passed§ 794, to create such an action. - The only de-
batable issue is whether there is an administrative exhaustion 
requirement. y the dist rict 
...... 
court yet, and it ought to be allowed to do so before review oc-
curs here. 
The substantive issue is equally important, and there 
it appears that the CA 4 was wrong. It may not be worthwhile --reviewing the issue at this stage, however. First, the CA 4 
seemed somewhat unsure of itself and the scope of its holding is 
in question. It stated at note 7a, petn. at 8a, 
7/ 
''We limit our holding and our interpretation 
of the above-quoted regulations to the facts 
of this particular case. We do not, at this 
- No mention is made of the constitutional claims as a basis 
for supporting the CA 4's judgment. 
8/ 
- Thus, it is not necessary to resort to§ 1983 to create the 
cause of action, as the district court did. Therefore, one of 
the issues underlying Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organ-
ization is not implicated here. 






time, absent a more fully developed 
record below, wish to expand further 
upon the regulations, their reason-
ableness, or their scope." 
Second, part of the CA 4's mandate was for the 
district court to consider whether§ 794 had affirmative 
action requirements for handicapped persons. This is a 
significant issue in itself, and the Court may want to 
review it after the lower courts have considered it. If 
that is true, however, it would seem to be preferable to 
review the issue in conjunction with the other substantive 
issue in this case, i.~., whether it is permissible to 
consider an applicant's handicap in admission decisions. 
Third, it is unclear whether respondent is going 
to be admitted to the program even if her handicap is 
✓ 
excluded from consideration. Admission is competitive, and 
respondent's academic qualifications apparently place her in 
the borderline category. 
There is a response as well as an amicus brief 
urging the Court to grant filed by the American Council on 
Education and 27 states. 
12/7/78 
ME 
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To: Paul Date: April 13, 1979 
From: L.F.P., Jr. 
No. 78-711 Soatheastern eornm; eolleqe v~ Davis 
Althouqh I believe the above case has been 
assiqned to Bruce, you may want to take a look at the briefs 
that deal with CA-4 having sustained an implied private 
cause of action under ~ection 504 of the Rehahilitation Act 
of 1973. 
The Act was amended in 1978, specifically 
authorizing private actions under Section 501 of the Act. 
This case involves Section 504. You might say to Bruce that 
; i particularly like his thinking as to the effect, with 
~ 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell .... 4,~ t4rf4.~J,1.-,~ ~ , 6-() 'f ~ 
Re: No. 7R-711, Southeastern · communitv College v; Davis .4-4.~~ 
This is the case of the deaf applicant for admission to 
nursing school. The facts and the decisions of the lower courts 
are stated in the Preliminary Memorandum. The case presents two 
questions: whether a private cause of action exists under~ 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and whether the CA arrived at 
the correct construction of the phrase "otherwise qualified 
handicapped individual" in that statute. 
72..., ~ ~., ... ,i.Z.c. 4.,;c....:t-~ 1~7? 
~ ~~ -',,e~ ✓---4~-1~ .,J-o --+f ~ 
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I. Private Cause of Action under§ 504 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as 
amended, provides: 
"No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in 
the United States, as defined [elsewhere in the 
statutel shal l , solely by reason of his handicap, be 
excluded from the Participation in, or denied the 
benefits of, or be subjecten to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance or - under anv program or activity 
conductea -bv - any -Executive agencv -or by - the -united 
States Posta1 · serv1ce." 
The underlined portion of the statute was added in 1978. The --Congress also added in 1978 the following provision, as~ 505 of --the Rehabilitation Act: 
"(a) (2) The remedies, procedures, and riqhts set 
forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
shall be available to anv person aggrieved by any 
act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal 
Assistance or Federal provider of such assistance 
under section 504 of this Act." 
Section 504 does not contain language creating a cause 
of action to enforce the right created there. It would be a 
reasonable construction of§ 504 to treat it as stating a rule 
that is to be enforced by the federal agencies that dispense 
financial assistance to proqrams and activities, and is not to 
be implemented by a private cause of action at all. 
~he incorporation by ~ 505 of Title VI remedies for 
violations of§ 504 does not itself indicate that a private 
cause of action is available. In Bakke, your opinion only 
assumed for the purpose of that case that there is a private 
cause of action to enforce the rights created by Title VI. And 
in Cannon, our draft opinion reiects the conclusion that there 





Title IX. Accordingly, there is a strong basis for the 
conclusion that even after there is no - ~ ~,-------~ 
private cause of action under §504. ----------'-"" ~ r 
3. 
Two other arguments supporting implication of a private 
cause of action under§ 504 must be considered. One of these is 
that whatever the intent of Congress regarding a private cause 
of action when it enacted Title VI in 1964, the courts by 1973 
in fact had found such a cause of action under that Title. 
,-- --- -
Accordingly, when Congress modeled other statutes such as Title 
IX or the Rehabilitation Act on Title VI, with express reference 
to such court decisions, it showed its intent to create a 
private cause of action. See Justice Stevens' opinion in 
Cannon, at 15-18: 31. In the present case, this arqument is 
if ~ 
buttressed by a passage in the Senate Committee Report stating 
- .. ... us - • 
that 
"Section 504 was patterned after, and is almost 
identical to, the antidiscrimination language of 
Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 •.. and 
Section 901 of the Education Amendments of 1972 •••. 
The language of Section 504, in following the above 
/A cited Act ••. permits a 7Udicial remedy through a 
Yf private action." 
Justice White makes an explicit response to this 
general form of argument in his Cannon opinion, at 9: "[T]o the 
extent the court based its holding on the proposition that an 
individual orotected bv a statute always has a right to enforce 
that statute, it was in error: and an erroneous interpretation 
of Title VI should not be compounded through importation into 
Title IX under the guise of effectuating legislative intent." 







rejection of Justice Stevens' argument. We point out that 
insofar as Conqress was relyina on Title VI and its construction 
by the lower federal courts, it was abdicating its 
responsibility to decide whether or not a private cause of 
action should be created. See footnote 12 of our opinion . I 
Nonetheless, in view of the language of the Senate Committee 
Report, I think it is a close question whether Congress did 
decide in fact to create a private cause of action under§ 504, 
and proceeded on the assumption that the language of~ 504 was 
adequate to that purpose . Given the difficulty of the question, 
this may be a good case in which to hammer home the point that 
we make in our Cannon opinion about the importance of explicit 
statutory creation of such private causes of action. 
The other evidence to which the resp points to 
demonstrate conqressional intent to create a private cause of 
action under~ 504 is the 1978 Amendments adding§ 505. That 
section incorporates the remedies of Title VI, and also provides 
for attorney's fees to the prevailing party in "any action or 
proceeding to enforce or charge a violation of a provision of 
this title". The resp cites oassaaes from the legislative 
reports and debates that assume and approve the intent to create 
a private cause of action when~ 504 was enacted in 1973. 
This history of the 1978 Amendments could be read as 
indicating something about conqressional intent in 1973. 
Justice Stevens uses such arguments in Cannon. But such -






change the intent of earlier ,£_ongress that enacted Title VI and 
.....,.._,. --·. -- --- .. 
§ 504 simply by incorporatinq Title VI remedies into the 
Rehabilitation Act and providing for attorney's fees for 
whatever private actions miaht have been created under§ 504. 
II. Meaning of "Otherwise Qualified Handicapped Individual" in 
§ 504 
If the Court reaches the merits of the CA 4's 
construction of~ 504, I think that it should reverse that 
court's remarkable interpretation of the statute. 
....... ~ ""'-- JPII\ ,, ....... - ..,, ~
Section 504 provides: 
"No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in 
the United States, as defined [elsewhere in the 
statutel shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be 
excluded from the participation in, or denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance or under any program or activity 
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United 
States Postal Service." 
The DC construed the statute to mean that no person who is 
qualified for participation in a program despite his physical 
handicap may be excluded from the program solely on the basis of 
that handicap. ~his amounts to a rule that no one is to be 
excluded automatically because of a physical handicap; rather, 
careful consideration must be qiven to whether the handicap 
would significantly affect the ability to participate in the 
program. Because deafness is a sianificant hindrance to 
completion of the course of training required of a registered 
nurse, the DC concluded, refusal to admit the resp to the petr's 
courses did not violate§ 504. 






its decision at least in part of HEW regulations issued after 
the DC's decision. It held that the resp's physical handicap 
should not have been considered in determining whether she was 
"otherwise qualified" for admission to resp's training course 
for nurses. Rather, the handicap should have been set to one 
side, and a decision made as to whether the resp had the 
requisite "academic and technical qualifications" for admission 
to the proqram. If she did, then the refusal to admit her 
constituted a violation of § 504. 
The DC seems to me to have hit on the more reasonable 
construction of the language of the statute. And the resµ does 
not cite any leqislative history to support the CA's 
construction of the statute. 
Indeed, the major portion of the section in resp's 
Brief that is titled "The ... Legislative History Support[sl the 
Court of Appeals' Decision" is devoted in fact to the argument 
that a "hearing impaired" nurse can function adequately and 
safelv in that profession. This mav be true, but has little 
relevance to the present case. First, it has no bearing on 
whether the CA or the DC arrived at the correct construction of 
§ 504. Second, assuming that the DC's construction is the 
correct one, the argument that a deaf Person can function 
adequately as a nurse does not entail the conclusion that such a 
person can function adequately as a nursing student. And it is 
the refusal by petr to admit resp as a nursing student, not its 
refusal to hire her as a nurse, that is at issue in this case. 






neither the "in spite of standard" of the DC nor the "without 
reqard to" standard of the CA, but some middle standard. Under 
this construction of the statute, institutions receivinq federal 
assistance are required to make "reasonable" modifications to 
existing programs and facilities to make participation by 
handicapped people more feasible. While limits on what must be 
done are still recognized under this approach (hence, the 
rejection of the CA's "without regard to" test), recipients are 
required to take some affirmative action to remove existing 
barriers. See SG's Brief, at 30. 
The SG's suggestion is a nice thought, with a little 
something for both the petr and the resp. The language of § 
504, and its leqislative history, qive no hint that the SG is 
correct about the intent underlying the statute. Moreover, I 
note that when Congress wanted to require modifications to 
facilitate activity by handicapped persons, it has proved itself 
able to do so explicitly. See, e;g;, 29 U.S.C. §792, dealing 
with architectural and transportation barriers to the mobility 
of physically handicapped persons; id.,~ 793, imposing duty on 
contractors with federal government to "take affirmative action 
to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped 
individuals". While it is true, as the SG asserts, that HEW 
requlations issued under§ 504 appear to contain some 
requirement of affirmative modification of educational programs 
to facilitate participation by the handicapped, even these 
requirements would not seem to go far enough to help the resp in 
this case. And I have serious doubts that~ 504 should be read 
- • 
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OPINION  ~ p 1---7 
-~e:c-~~ 
~~~ 
RE: Southeastern -community College v. Davis, No. 78-711 
\\~ 
DATE: May 23, 1979 ~ '-\ 
Mr; Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents a matter of first impression for 
this Court: Whether Congress, in prohibiting discrimination 
against "otherwise qualified handicapped individual[s]" in 
federally funded programs through§ 504 of the Rehabilitation 
LAA-~ 
Act of 1973, IU.9-a~ to forbid professional schools from imposing 
physical qualifications for admission to their clinical training 
programs. 
I 
Respondent suffers from a serious hearing disability 
but seeks to be trained as a registered nurse. During the 1973-
1974 academic year she was enrolled in the College Parallel 
program of Southeastern Community College, a state institution 
that receives federal funds. Respondent hoped to progress to 
Southeastern's Associate Degree Nursing program, completion of 
2. 
which is necessary for state certification as a registered 
nurse. In the course of her application to the nursing program, 
she was interviewed by a member of the nursing faculty. It 
became apparent that respondent had difficulty understanding 
. k .. h ~ f~h. f questions as ed, and on 1nqu1ry s e tted to a 1story o 
, I\ 
hearing problems and dependence on a hearing aid. She was 
advised to consult an audiologist. 
On the basis of an examination at Duke University 
Medical Center, respondent was diagnosed as having a "bilateral, 
sensori-neural hearing loss." App. 127a. A change in her 
hearing aid was recommended, as a result of which it was 
L~.tJ~ 4 1 ;>~~ 7 
r~- ( 
,,v.,t,'-----7 
expected that "she would be able . to hear a talker almost as well 
~ 
as a person would who has normal hearing." App. 127a-128a. 
This improvement would not mean that she could discriminate 
~,;,,. f't.-~ \ 
~~ I 
~ 
among sounds sufficiently to understand normal spoken speech: 
her lip-reading skills remained necessary for effective 
communication. "While wearing the hearing aid, she is well 
aware of gross sounds occurring in the listening environment. 
-/ However, she can only be responsible for speech spoken to her, 
when the talker gets her attention and allows her to look 
directly at the talker." App. 128a. 
7 
3. 
Southeastern next consulted Mary McRee, Executive 
Director of the North Carolina Board of Nursing. On the basis 
of the audiologist's report, Miss McRee recommended that 
~-lo 
respondent not be considered for the nursing program. In 
McRee's view, respondent's hearing disability made it unsafe for 
her to practice as a nurse. I!,_ In addition, it would be 
impossible for respondent to participate safely in the normal 
clinical training program, and those modifications that would be 
necessary to enable safe participation would prevent her from 
realizing the benefits of the program: "To adjust patient 
learning experiences in keeping with [respondent's] hearing 
limitations could, in fact, be the same as denying her full 
learning to meet the objectives of your nursing programs." App. 
132a-133a. 
~ 
After respondent was notified that she was I.Hlqualified 
/\ 
for nursing study because of her hearing disability, she 
requested reconsideration of the decision. The entire nursing 
staff of Southeastern was assembled, and o/ McRee again was 
consulted. McRee repeated her contention that on the basis of 
the available evidence, respondent "has hearing limitations 
which could interfere with her safely caring for patients." 
App. 139a. Upon further deliberation, the staff voted to deny 
respondent admission. 
4. 
Respondent then filed suit in federal district court, 
alleging both a violation of§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794,k_ and a denial 
of equal protection and due process. After a bench trial, the 
district court entered judgment in favor of Southeastern. 424 
F. Supp. 1341 (E.D.N.C. 1976). It confirmed the findings of the 
audiologist that even with a hearing aid respondent cannot 
understand speech directed to her except through lip-reading, 
and further found that, 
"[I]n many situations such as an operation room 
intensive care unit, or post-natal care unit, all 
doctors and nurses wear surgical masks which would 
make lip reading impossible. Additionally, in 
many situations a Registered Nurse would be 
required to instantly follow the physician's 
instructions concerning procurement of various 
types of instruments and drugs where the physician 
would be unable to get the nurse's attention by 
other than vocal means." Id~, at 1343. -
Accordingly, the court concluded that, 
"[Respondent's] handicap actually prevents her 
from safely performing in both her training 
program and her proposed profession. The trial 
testimony indicated numerous situations where 
[respondent's] particular disability would render 
her unable to function properly. Of particular 
concern to the court in this case is the potential 
danger to future patients in such situations." 
Id., at 1345. 
~ 
'P~- ~ ft.-_ El/CA'+~~ 
~ ~~ ~ (~ 1-uA, of~ 
~~-~qt~~-2 
~~~~  . 
~~  ~~~~ ~l-4..t 
Based on these findings, the djstrict <:,_ourt ~ 
concluded that respondent was not an "otherwise qualified 
handicapped individual" protected against discrimination by 
§ 504. In its view, "[o]therwise qualified, can only be 
read to mean otherwise able to function sufficiently in the 
position sought in spite of the handicap, if proper 
training and facilities are suitable and available." Id. 
~ 
Because respondent's disability~ prevent her from 
I\ 
,, \\ l-4u,_ ~~~ 
functioning sufficiently in Southeastern's nursing program, A 
" A , J 
. ~ -· ~ ~ ~L~~ 
the decision to exclude herAeio net ..amoYnt ~ the kind oC 1 
w-c..~ ~ ' 5 SD t.f-2.J 
d iscr imirra ~ . ~ hi,-laited .\L_ 
On appeal, the~!i:'Z~l;;_~ F.2d 
1158 (1978). It did not dispute the district court's 
:::: 
findings of fact, but held that the court had misconstrued 
§ 504. In light of administrative regulations that had 
been promulgated while the appeal was pending, see 42 Fed. 
~~ 
Reg. 22676 (May 4, 1977),\i_the court believed that§ 504 
.-\ 
required Southeastern to "reconsider plaintiff's 
application for admission to the nursing program without 
--regard to her hearing ability." Id., at 1160. -+A the v 
-eemcte-sf •PP&•~ ~ s~ courth:,:1ed iay( t:;ing 
I\ -:::: = A ~ 








_; , ~ 
~ 
she was "otherwise qualified" for the program, rather than 
confining its inquiry to her "academic and technical 
qualifications." Id., at 1161. The f ourt of /Jppeals also -- - --
suggested that§ 504 required "affirmative conduct" on the 
part of Southeastern to modify its program to accomodate 
the disabilities of applicants, "even when such 
modifications become expensive." Id., at 1162. 
Because of the importance of this issue to the 
many institutions covered by§ 504, we granted certiorari. 
439 U.S. _____. (1979). We now reverse-~ 
II 
X-r 
This is the first case in which this Court has 
been called upon to to interpret§ 504. Itis ~~ 
that "(t]he starting point in every case involving the 
construction of a statute is the language itself." Blue 
Chip -stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) 
(Powell, J., concurring). Section 504 by its terms does 
not compel educational institutions to disregard the 
disabilities of handicapped individuals or to make 
substantial modifications in their programs to allow 
disabled persons to participate. It requires only that an 
6. 
"otherwise qualified handicapped individual" not be 
excluded from participation in a federally funded program 
"solely by reason of his handicap." This does not suggest 
that covered institutions must ignore relevant physical 
incapacities caused by handicaps; rather, it indicates 
that mere possession of a handicap is not a permissible 
ground for assuming an inability to function in a 
particular context.~ 
The court below, however, believed that the class 
of "otherwise qualified" persons protected by§ 504 
includes persons who, but for their disability, would be 
able to meet the requirements of a particular program. See 
574 F.2d, at 1160. Taken literally, this holding would 
prevent an institution from taking into account any 
limitation created by a handicap. We think this 
construction is •e xcEed i ng 1% s traiRQQ aoo at odds with the 
plain meaning of the statutory language. In effect it 
reads into the statute a limitation on the other 
qualifications which a handicapped person can be required 
to possess: It assumes a person need not meet legitimate 
physical requirements in order to be "otherwise qualified." 




the mark. An otherwise qualified person is one who is able 
~
to meet a program's ~requirements in spite of his handicap. 
The regulations promulgated by the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to interpret§ 504 
reinforce, rather than contradict, this conclusion. 
According to these regulations, a "[q]ualified handicapped 
person" is, "[w]ith respect to postsecondary and vocational 
education services, a handicapped person who meets the 
academic and technical standards requisite to admission or 
participation in the [school's] education program or 
activity •• II 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(3)(1978). An 
--
note states: 
"Paragraph (k) of§ 84.3 defines the term 
'qualified handicapped person.' Throughout the 
regulation, this term is used instead of the 
statutory term 'otherwise qualified handicapped 
person.' The Department believes that the 
omission of the word 'otherwise' is necessary in 
order to comport with the intent of the statute 
because, read literally, 'otherwise' qualified 
handicapped persons include persons who are 
qualified except for their handicap, rather than 
in spite of their handicap. Under such a literal 
reading, a blind person possessing all the 
qualifications for driving a bus except sight 
could be said to be 'otherwise qualified' for the 




intended by Congress. In all other respects, the 
terms 'qualified' and 'otherwise qualified' are 
intended to be interchangeable." 45 C.F.R. pt. 
84, App. A, at p. 405. 
Referring specifically to the qualifications for 
9. 
postsecondary programs such as 
~~µ?..-• ? ,~ 






"The term 'technical standards' refers to all 
nonacademic admissions criteria that are essential 
to participation in the program in question." Id. 
(emphasis supplied). 
We ~ ee -w-it.h the s e e-9mments, 
(a.,,} { I ~) 
~ that HEW ·t clear JNh i.ch---ma k ;.\ i 
6 -..alse interprets the "other" qualifications which a 
handicapped person may be required to meet e--s includ ~ 
legitimate physical requirements for the particular 
~ 
program. ~ ,,._.;.., 1 ,1: M- \$ ~ 
____,. 
-S--- //) -w ad4xicJt_.., 
Ev-efl- t hou.g~ t h e f ou r:..t of AJppe a 1 s erred in ruling 
trrat-§ ~ O4-prohib-Lted- consideration of an appl-i---cant' s -
physlca J:-c-apaeilities, Lts judgment still could be uphe-J.d 
if it app-eare rom t h--ts-"recor 
J.,wz_ 
a.a t t ~ e physical 
_L 
L:,1s1µ c "f>CtPf 
e 
qualifications Southeastern demanded of respondentA~ig0 .S¼ 
~ t b..,.:=::::;~ participation in its nursing program. 
~ 





Associate Degree Nursing program currently is constituted, 
the ability to understand speech without reliance on lip-
reading is necessary for patient safety during the clinical -
phase of the program. As the district court found, this ,,..... 
ability also is indispensible for many functions a 
Registered Nurse perform.r{Respondent contend~ , 
that§ 504, properly interpreted, compels Southeastern to 
~\~ ~'vjt ..... 3.'..., 
-mak~cr-djus t men c s that would dispense with the need for 
1 0. 
v 
effective oral communication. First, it is suggested< UJ"" 
respondent can be given individual supervision by faculty 
~ 
members whenever she comes .iato CQfl.t. a ct. r,ii-t: ~ patients:(' ~I&,. 
~ "lfVrr:~ .r ~~>-j~ ,2.,~ 
F ~ certain co rses~ migh Q be dispensed with ~
~~- ·~ ... r~ 
altogether A It is not necessary, r-espoftdent argues, that 
f\ ,... A 
5k--("' 
Southeastern train her to undertake all the tasks a 
registered nurse is licensed to perform. Rather, it is 
~ ~ ± 
sufficient to) o£ in-g § 504,.Ji R--to pl a y k hat respondent might 
~ be ab~ ~~ os itJ.=~ lal e 
~~~ ~M"k~~~~~~ 
-t:-ei'\ a registered nursex \7_. -~,L.o -a::=~ 
. aa ~
Respondent ~ ort for this argument ~ 
~-~~ -
~ portions of the HEW regulations ~ omul-ga t-e·d afte r-the 
,,.-< 





~ o-t~~I ~~~ 
~$ (A.A_ .tJ(._ ~ ~ 
~~~t-
"(a) Academic requirements. A recipient [of 
federal funds] to which this subpart applies shall 
make such modifications to its academic 
requirements as are necessary to ensure that such 
requirements do not discriminate or have the 
effect of discriminating, on the basis of 
handicap, against a qualified handicapped 
applicant or student. Academic requirements that 
the recipient can demonstrate are essential to the 
program of instruction being pursued by such 
student or to any directly related licensing 
requirement will not be regarded as discriminatory 
within the meaning of this section. Modifications 
may include changes in the length of time 
permitted for the completion of degree 
requirements, substitution of specific courses 
required for the completion of degree 
requirements, and adaptation of the manner in 
which specific courses are conducted. 
"(d) Auxiliary -aids. (1) A recipient to which 
this subpart applies shall take such steps as are 
necessary to ensure that no handicapped student is 
denied the benefits of, excluded from 
participation in, or otherwise subjected to 
discrimination under the education program or 
activity operated by the recipien~ because of the 
absence of educational auxiliary aids for students 
with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills. 
"(2) Auxiliary aids may include taped texts, 
interpreters or other effective methods of making 
orally delivered materials available to students 
with hearing impairments, readers in libraries for 




~~  ~ ~:,fs75b ~ ~~ ~ 1 2_.__ 
~! Sf4-o;4,Z;..~U/~ 
equip;~«'f. adapted for use by students with manual~, 
impairments, and other similar services and ~ 
~ 
actions. Recipients need not provide attendants, ~ 
individually prescribed devices, readers for P/ t!{_ 
personal use or study, or other devices or 




that this regulation imposes an 
"affirmative action" obligation to ensure full 







individuals and, in particular, requires Southeastern to 
make the kind of adjustments that would be necessary\ to 
permit her safe participation in the nursing program. \ 
'---- ---- -- ~ 
We note first that on the present record it 
appears unlikely respondent could benefit from any 
affirmative action that the regulation reasonably could be 
interpreted as requiring. Section 84.44(d)(2), for 
example, explicitly excludes "devices or services of a 
personal nature" from the kinds of auxilary aids a school 
must provide a handicapped individual. Yet the only 
evidence in the record indicates that nothing less than 
close, individual attention by a nursing instructor would 
be sufficient to ensure patient safety if respondent took 
part in the clinical phase of the nursing program. As the 
lead instructor for medical-surgical nursing at 
Southeastern testified: 
~ 
"It would take a great deal of supervision [to 
permit respondent to participate in clinical 
training], but even with that much supervision, 
sometimes I have a one to four student ratio/ 
which is as good as any clinical instructor would 
ever have, but I still would not at times be able 
to stay with her. She is still going to have 
times when she is going to be alone and have to 
hear things herself. I wouldn't always be there 
with her and if you're thinking of having one 
instructor per one student, I'm sure Dr. Mccarter 
[the president of Southeastern] would have to 
close the college, there is no way that we can 
have that kind and she might, I don't know that 
she could even do it then if she had a one to one, 
I don't know." App. 77a. 
The district court found that respondent produced no _., 
evidence as to her ability to participate safely in the 
program "except to elicit an admission on cross examination 
that with special training and individual supervision she 
r6 I ll • • ' )---
could perform adequately in some selected fields of 
nursing." 424 F. Supp., at 1346 , ~emphasi s snppJied) ,Y-
Furthermore, it also is reasonably clear that§ 
84.44(a) does not encompass the kind of curricular changes 
that would be necessary to accomodate respondent in the 
nursing program. In light of respondent's inability to 
function in clinical courses without close supervision, 
Southeastern with prudence could allow her to take only 
1 3. 
I 
academic classes. Whatever benefits respondent might 
realize from such a course of study, she would not receive 
even a rough equivalent of the training a nursing program 
normally gives. Such a fundamental alteration in the 
nature of a program is far more than the "modification" the 
regulation requires. 
If the question were only the adequacy of 
respondent's evidence to support a claim under the HEW 
regulations, f ' it might be appropriate to permit 
respondent to supplement the record. Respondent contends, 
and the court below held, that she should have a further 
opportunity to show what modifications Southeastern may be 
~ -~ 
required to make in its program as a result of ~~ e 
~~~-, 
...i.i)-- tltt? law. But if these regulations were to require 
I\ 
substantial adjustments in existing programs beyond those 
necessary to eliminate discrimination against otherwise 
qualified individuals, they would do more than clarify the 
meaning of§ 504. Instead, they would constitute an 
unauthorized extension of the obligations imposed by that 
statute. 
The language and structure of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 reflect a recognition by Congress of the 
1 4 • 
15. 
distinction between the even-handed treatment of qualified 
handicapped persons and affirmative efforts to overcome the 
disabilities caused by handicaps. Section 501(b), 
governing the employment of handicapped individuals by the 
federal government, requires each federal agency to submit 
"an affirmative action program plan for the hiring, 
placement, and advancement of handicapped individuals ••• 
" These plans "shall include a description of the extent 
to which and methods whereby the special needs of 
handicapped employees are being met." Similarly,§ 503(a), 
governing hiring by federal contractors, requires employers 
to "take affirmative action to employ and advance in 
employment qualified handicapped individuals ••• " The 
President is required to promulgate regulations to enforce 
this section. Under§ 501(c) of the Act, by contast, state 
agencies such as Southeastern are only "encourage[d] 
to adopt such policies and procedures." And§ 504 does not 
refer at all to affirmative action, and except as it 
applies to federal employers it does not provide for 
implementation by administrative action. A comparison of 
h . . > d t ese prov1s1ons demonstrate that Congress understoo 
I\ 
accomodation of the needs of handicapped individuals may 
require affirmative action and knew how to provide for it 
in those instances where it wished to do so. 
1 6. 
As we have stated above,§ 504 of the Act by its 
reference to "otherwise qualified" handicapped persons 
admits the possibility that some handicapped persons 
because of physical incapacity will be unqualified for 
certain positions. Moreover, nothing in the language of 
that statute indicates an affirmative obligation on the 
part of all recipients of federal funds to eliminate such 
incapacities through substantial and expensive adjustments. 
And it would be inconsistent with the structure of the Act 
i. 
to construe its terms to create such an obligation. Those 
entities upon which an affirmative action obligation is 
expressly imposed are in a position to defray the costs 
involved, either by seeking an increased appropriation (in 
the case of federal agencies) or by bargaining for 
increased compensation (in the case of federal contractors 
who act as employers). Institutions such as Southeastern, 
in contrast, lack this ability to provide for the expenses 
of affirmative action. Their only alternatives are to 
forego federal funding altogether or to divert those funds 
from designated purposes to pay the cost of affirmative 
action .I§_ 
Although an agency's interpretation of the statute 
under which it operates is entitled to some deference, 
"this deference is constrained by our obligation to honor 
the clear meaning of a statute, as revealed by its 
language, purpose and history." International -Brotherhood 
of -Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. n. 20 (1979). 
Here neither the language, purpose, nor history of§ 504 
reveals an intent to impose an affirmative action 
obligation on all recipients of federal funds.\2_ 
~ 
Accordingly, we T hold that Aif HEW has attempted to 
create such an obligation itself, it lacks the authority to 
do so. 
We do not ~ suggest that the line between a 
lawful refusal to extend affirmative action and illegal 
discrimination against handicapped persons always will be 
clear. It is possible to envision situations where an 
insistence on continuing past requirements and practices 
might arbitrarily deprived genuinely qualified handicapped 
persons of the opportunity to participate in a covered 
program. As technological advances reduce the expense of 
particular adjustments and permit greater freedom of action 
on the part of handicapped individuals, a refusal to modify 
1 7. 
an existing program might become unreasonable and 
discriminatory. Identification of those instances where a 
refusal to accomodate the needs of a disabled person 
amounts to discrimination against the handicapped continues 
to be an important responsibility of HEW. 
In this case, however, it is clear that 
Southeastern's unwillingness to alter its nursing program 
does not constitute such discrimination. ~ espondent does 
not disput~ that as long as she remains dependent on lip-
reading to understand what is spoken to her, she cannot 
safely undertake many of the functions traditionally 
performed by registered nurses. Furthermore] ~twas the 
uncontroverted testimony of several members of 
Southeastern's staff and faculty that their program had as 
a goal the preparation of persons who could serve in all 
areas of the nursing profession. See, e;g., App. 35a, 52a, 
53a, 71a, 74a. This goal, far from reflecting any animus 
against handicapped individuals, is shared by many 
professions where specialization is resisted and the 
purpose of education is seen as providing a full background 
to the student.h.,g_ Section 504 does not require 
Southeastern to abandon this goal to accomodate respondent, 
1 8. 
1 9 • 
and it is uncontroverted that respondent's participation in 
the nursing program would conflict with this goal. Under 
these circumstances, Southeastern did not violate§ 504 
when it refused to consider respondent for admission to its 
program. 
III 
In summary, we hold that§ 504 does not forbid an 
educational institution from requiring legitimate physical 
qualifications for its clinical training programs. Nor 
does it compel such institutions substantially to alter the 
programs they offer to eliminate the need for such 
qualifications. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of 







1. Miss McRee also wrote that respondent's 
hearing disability could preclude her practicing safely in 
"any setting" allowed by "a license as LPN." App. 132a. 
Respondent contends that inasmuch as she already was 
licensed as a Practical Nurse, ~ McRee's opinion was 
inherently incredible. But the record indicates that 
respondent had "not worked as a practical nurse except to 
do a little bit of night duty," App. 32a, and had not done 
that for several years before applying to Southeastern. 
Accordingly, it is at least possible to inf~ t ~ at T £'? 
McRee did not understand the requirements for nursing, b~ --r ~ 
that respondent in fact could not work safely as a 
practical nurse in spite of her license to do so. In any 
event, we note ther finding of the district court that "a 
Licensed Practical Nurse, unlike a Licensed Registered 
Nurse, operates under constant supervision and is not 
allowed to perform medical tasks which require a great 
degree of technical sophistication." 424 F. Supp. 1341, 
1342-1343 (E.D.N.C. 1976). 
2. The statute provides in full: 
"No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in 
the United States, as defined in section 706(6) of 
this title, shall, solely by reason of his 
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, 
or be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance or under 
any -program · or -activity -conducted -by · any Executive 
I 
agency or by the :linited -states -Posta~ Service. 
The -head -of each such -agency shall -prom~lga~e such 
reg9lation~ · as · may be -necessary to carry out the 
amendments - to - this section may by the 
Rehabilitation, -comprehensive · services, · and 
Developmental -Disabilities -Act of · 1978. Copies -of 
any -proposed regulation · sha11 -be submitted to 
appropriate -authorizing committees -of - the 
Congress; · and - such regulation may - take · effect no 
earlier than -~he · thirtieth · ~ay -after ; th~ ~date : 9n 
which -such - regulation is so - submitted to -such 
committees." 
The italicized portion of the section was added by the 
Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental 
Disabilities Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2982. Respondent 
asserts no claim under this portion of the statute. 
3. The district court also dismissed respondent's - ----
constitutional claims. The court of appeals affirmed that 
portion of the order, and respondent has not sought review 
of this ruling. 
4. Relying on the plain language of the Act, the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) at first 









.J,/ , 1 
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~ 
a subsequent suit against HEW, however, the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia held that 
Congress had intended regulations to be issued and ordered 
HEW to do so. Cherry v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp. 922 (1976). 
The ensuing regulations currently are embodied in 45 C.F.R. 
pt. 8 4. 
As HEW now seeks to give these regulations full 
force, we express no view as to the correctness of the 
determination that Congress intended some regulations to be 
~ 
promulgated in spite of A-H; failure expressly to provide 
for them. But cf. n. 9, infra. 
5. In addition to challenging the construction of 
§ 504 by the ( ourt of Pippeals, Southeastern also contends 
that respondent cannot seek judicial relief for violations 
of that statute in view of the absence of any express 
private right of action. In light of our disposition of 
uf-~~ 
this case on the merits, we do not need to address this 
-4 
issue)' and we express no views on it. See Norton v. 
Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 529-531 (1976); Moor v. County of 
Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715 (1973); United States v. 
Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 351-352 (1969). 
FN3. 
follows: 
6. The Act defines "handicapped individual" as 
"The term 'handicapped individual' means any 
individual who (A) has a physical or mental 
disability which for such individual constitutes 
or results in a substantial handicap to employment 
and (B) can reasonably be expected to benefit in 
terms of employability from vocational 
rehabilitation services provided pursuant to 
subchapters I and III of this chapter. For the 
purposes of subchapters IV and V of this chapter, 
such term means any person who (A) has a physical 
or mental impairment which substantially limits 
one or more of such person's major life 
activities, (B) has a record of such an 
impairment, or (C) is regarded as having such an 
impairment." Section 7 of the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973, 87 Stat. 359, as amended, 88 Stat. 1619, 
89 Stat. 2, 29 U.S.C. § 706(6). 
This definition comports with our understanding of§ 504. 
A person who has a record of or is regarded as having an 
impairment may at present have no actual incapacity at all. 
1~....... Such a person would be / ~ ar§ mJ ~ the kind of individual 
~--f ~ r' ~Pho could be "otherwise qualified" to participate in 
~ · covered programs. And a person who suffers from a limiting 
physical or mental impairment still may possess other 
abilities that permit him to meet the requirements of 
FN4. 
2 
various programs. Thus it is clear that Congress included 
among the class of "handicapped" persons covered by§ 504 a 
range of individuals who could be "otherwise qualified." 
Sees. Rep. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1974). 
argument: 
7. The court below adopted a portion of this 
"[Respondent's] ability to read lips aids her in 
overcoming her hearing disability; however, it 
was argued that in certain situations such as in 
an operating room environment where surgical masks 
are used, this ability would be unavailing to her. 
"Be that as it may, in the medical community, 
there does appear to be a number of settings in 
which the plaintiff could perform satisfactorily 
as an RN, such as in industry or perhaps a 
physician's office. Certainly [respondent] could 
be viewed as possessing extraordinary insight into 
the medical and emotional needs of those with 
hearing disabilities. 
"If [respondent] meets all the other criteria 
for admission in the pursuit of her RN career, 
under the relevant North Carolina statutes, N.C. 
Gen. Stat. §§ 90-158, et~ seq;, it should not be 
foreclosed to her simply because she may not be 
able to function effectively in all the roles 
which registered nurses may choose for their 
careers." 574 F.2d 1158, 1161 n.6 (4th Cir. 
1978). 
FN5. 
8. Indeed, Congress when providing funds for 
particular activities often expresses a desire not to alter 
the content of the recipient's program. With respect to 
nurse training, for example, § 2 of the Nurse Training Act 
of 1964, 78 Stat. 912, states that: 
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be 
construed as authorizing any department, agency, 
officer, or employee of the United States to 
exercise any direction, supervision, or control 
over, or impose any requirement or condition with 
respect to, the personnel, curriculum, methods of 
instruction, or administration of any 
institution." 42 u.s.c. § 298a. 
Section 115(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1978 did add to 
the 1973 Act a section authorizing grants to state units 
for the purpose of providing "such information and 
technical assistance (including support personnel such as 
interpreters for the deaf) as may be necessary to assist 
those entities in complying with this Act, particularly the 
requirements of section 504." 92 Stat. 2971, codified at 
29 U.S.C. § 775. This provision recognizes that on 
occasion the elimination of discrimination might involve 
some costs; it does not imply that the refusal to 









constitutes discrimination. Whatever effect the 
availability of these funds might have on ascertaining the 
existence of discrimination in some future case, no such 
funds were available to Southeastern at the time respondent 
sought admission to its nursing program. 
9. The Government, in a brief amicus curiae in 
Mal O .. $ ::, t, i;. t -is ½ i.a ;k:: ~ ~ ~ l-
s u ppo rt of respondent, cites a report of the Senate 
Committee on Labor and Publ#.elfare on the 1974 
Jr.,st-~s "'d ~~----~ ~ ~ ~ 
amendments of the 1973 Act~ he tep01:-t:-&~ re 
~ ~ - ~ t°af~ 0+- ... J ..... ~ ~ V:J...:'~ ~ ~p.. ~ i 5,4 
applicable, section 504 is intended to include a 
~- ~'v~\c.. a..}.~ 
requirement of affirmative action as well as a prohibition 
against discrimination." S. Rep. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 39 (1974). Further in the report, the Committee also 
expressed the view that Congress intended to require the 
promulgation of regulations to enforce§ 504 in spite of 
its silence on the matter. Id., at 39-40. The Government 
argues that the regulations that did issue, which responded 
specifically to this particular expression of legislative 
intent, see Cherry v. Mathews, 416 F. Supp. 922, 924 
(D.D.C.1976); n. 4 supra, thus reflect Congress' 
understanding of§ 504. We are asked to give special 






transmitted to Congress, and that Congress took no action 
to prevent their implementation. We also are referred to 
several statements by individual members of the 95th 
------Congress in either hearings or floor debate which suggest a 
belief that§ 504 quires-a ff i-1:.'-ffia t i-v e- ac-t i e-rr • See Brie f 
for the Government as Amicus Curiae 44-50. 
These isolated statements by individual members 
Congress or its committees, all made ~~m~t 
~ 
the statute under consideration, cannot substitute for a 
clear expression of legislative intent at the time of 
¥" 
enactment. oriec5"f the~e ~tatements illuminates the 
history of the 1973 Act; rather, they express opinions 
arrived at after Congress had completed its work. Thus 
these individual comments cannot even be characterized as 
of 
of 
Lviews passed about which Congress was on notice at the time Nor do these comments, none of which 
represents the will of Congress as a whole, constitute 
subsequent "legislation" such as this Court might weigh in 
construing the meaning of an earlier enactment. Cf. Red 
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-381 (1969). 
The Government also argues that various amendments 
to the 1973 Act contained in the Rehabilitation Act of 1978 
FN8. 
FN9. 
further reflect Congress' approval of the affirmative 
action obligation created by HEW's regulations. But the 
amendment most directly on point decidedly undercuts this 
position. In amending§ 504, Congress both extended that 
section's prohibition of discrimination to "any program or 
activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United 
States Postal Service" and authorized administrative 
regulations only to implement this -~mendment. See note 2 
supra. The fact that no other regulations were mentioned 
supports an inference that no others were authorized. 
Section 120 of the-1~78 Act, codi r1ed at 29 u.s.c. 
refers only to the regulations authorized by the amendment 
Finally, we note that the assertion by HEW of the 
authority to promulgate these regulations has been neither 
consistent nor longstanding. For the first three years 
after§ 504 was enacted, HEW maintained the position that 
Congress had not intended any regulations to be issued. It 
altered its stand only after having been enjoined to do so. 
Seen. 4., supra. This fact substantially diminishes the 
deference to be given to HEW's present interpretation of 
the statute. ~ ~ 0-e..c}~~ G, , v , (;,lW I 4-).t) O,S, 
FN10. 
10. Respondent contends that it is unclear 
whether North Carolina law requires a registered nurse to 
be capable of performing all functions open to that 
profession in order to obtain a license to practice, 
although Miss McRee, the Executive Director of the state 
Board of Nursing, had informed Southeastern that the law 
did so require. See App. 138a-139a. Respondent further 
argues that even if she is not capable of meeting North 
Carolina's present licensing requirements, she still might 
succeed in obtaining a license in another jurisdiction. 
Respondent's argument misses the point. 
~ ~,a..,~~ I.a --
Southeastern' s ~.l-.e,fA train • persons who w-i-B.: bez:~-&-' 
perform)t' all~~tered nurse, ~ill represents 
~~ ~4 ~.Y~ , 
a legitimate academic policy regardless of the licensing 
;\ 
requirements of North 
Aftt.d Aio!'h 
~-?~~ 
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Southeastern Community College v. Davis 
Mr; Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents a matter of first impression for 
this Court: Whether§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 
which prohibits discrimination against an "otherwise qualified 
handicapped individual" in federally funded programs "solely by 
reason of his handicap," forbids professional schools from 
imposing physical qualifications for admission to their clinical 
training programs. 
I 
Respondent, who suffers from a serious hearing 
disability, seeks to be trained as a registered nurse. During 
the 1973-1974 academic year she was enrolled in the College 
Parallel program of Southeastern Community College, a state 
institution that receives federal funds. Respondent hoped to 
progress to Southeastern's Associate Degree Nursing program, 
completion of which would make her eligible for state 
certification as a registered nurse. In the course of her 
application to the nursing program, she was interviewed by a 
member of the nursing faculty. It became apparent that 
respondent had difficulty underst a nding questions asked, and on 
inquiry she acknowledged a history of hearing problems and 
dependence on a hearing aid. She was advised to consult an 
audiologist. 
2. 
On the basis of an examination at Duke University 
Medical Center, respondent was diagnosed as having a "bilateral, 
sensori-neural hearing loss." App. 127a. A change in her 
hearing aid was recommended, as a result of which it was 
expected that she would be able to detect sounds "almost as well 
as a person would who has normal hearing." App. 127a-128a. But 
this improvement would not mean that she could discriminate 
among sounds sufficiently to understand normal spoken speech. 
Her lip-reading skills would remain necessary for effective 
communication: "While wearing the hearing aid, she is well 
aware of gross sounds occurring in the listening environment. 
However, she can only be responsible for speech spoken to her, 
when the talker gets her attention and allows her to look 
directly at the talker." App. 128a. 
Southeastern next consulted Mary McRee, Executive 
Director of the North Carolina Board of Nursing. On the basis 
of the audiologist's report, McRee recommended that respondent 
not be admitted to the nursing program. In McRee's view, 
respondent's hearing disability made it unsafe for her to 
practice as a nurse. l/ In addition, it would be impossible for 
respondent to participate safely in the normal clinical training 
program, and those modifications that would be necessary to 
enable safe participation would prevent her from realizing the 
benefits of the program: "To adjust patient learning 
experiences in keeping with [respondent's] hearing limitations 
could, in fact, be the same as denying her full learning to meet 
the objecti~es of your nursing programs." App. 132a-133a. 
3. 
After respondent was notified that she was not 
qualified for nursing study because of her hearing disability, 
she requested reconsideration of the decision. The entire 
nursing staff of Southeastern was assembled, and McRee again was 
consulted. McRee repeated her conclusion that on the basis of 
the available evidence, respondent "has hearing limitations 
which could interfe re with her safely caring £or patients." 
App. 139a. Upon further deliberation, the staff voted to deny 
respondent admission. 
Respondent then filed suit in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, 
alleging both a violation of§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794, II and a denial 
of equal protection and due process. After a bench trial, the 
District Court entered judgment in favor of Southeastern. 424 
F. Supp. 1341 (1976). It confirmed the findings of the 
audiologist that even with a hearing aid respondent cannot 
understand speech directed to her except through lip-reading, 
and further found that, 
"[I]n many situations such as an operation room 
intensive care unit, or post-natal c a re unit, all 
doctors and nurses wear surg ical masks which would 
make lip reading impossibl e . Additionally , in 
many situations a Registered Nurse would be 
required to instantly follow the physician's 
instructions conce rning procurement of various 
types of instruments and drugs where the physician 
would be unable to get the nurse's attention by 
other than vocal me ans." Id., at 1343. ---
Accordingly, the Court concluded that: 
"[Responde nt's] handicap actually prevents her 
from safe ly p e rforming in both her training 
program and her propos e d profession. The trial 
testimony indicated numerous situations where 
[responde nt's] particular disability would render 
her unable to function properly. Of particular 
concern to the court in this case is the potential 
danger to future patients in such situations." 
Id;, at 1345. 
Based on these findings, the District Court 
concluded that respondent was not an "otherwise qualified 
handicapped individual" protected against discrimination by 
§ 504. In its view, "[o]therwise qualified, can only be 
read to mean otherwise able to function sufficiently in the 
position sought in spite of the handicap, if proper 
training and facilities are suitable and available." Id. 
Because respondent's disability would prevent her from 
functioning "sufficiently" in Southeastern's nursing 
program, the Court held that the decision to exclude her 
was not discriminatory within the meaning of§ 504.l/ 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit reversed. 574 F.2d 1158 (1978). It did not 
dispute the District Court's findings of fact, but held 
that the Court had misconstrued§ 504. In light of 
administrative regulations that had been promulgated while 
the appeal was pending, see 42 Fed. Reg. 22676 (May 4, 
1977),!/ the appellate court believed that§ 504 required 
Southeastern to "reconsider plaintiff's application for 
admission to the nursing program without regard to her 
hearing ability." Id;, at 1160. It concluded that the 
District Court had erred in taking respondent's handicap 
4. 
into account in determining whether she was "otherwise 
qualified" for the program, rather than confining its 
inquiry to her ''academic and technical qualifications." 
Id., at 1161. The Court of Appeals also suggested that§ 
504 required "affirmative conduct" on the part of 
Southeastern to modify its program to accommodate the 
disabilities of applicants, "even when such modifications 
become expensive." Id., at 1162. 
Because of the importance of this issue to the 
many institutions covered by§ 504, we granted certiorari. 
439 U.S. (1979). We now reverse.1/ 
II 
This is the first case in which this Court has 
been called upon to to interpret§ 504. It is elementary 
that "[t]he starting point in every case involving the 
construction of a statute is the language itself." Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor · Drug · Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) 
(Powell, J., concurring); see Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood 
Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 330 (1978); Santa Fe 
Industries, · Inc ; v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977). 
Section 504 by its terms does not compel educational 
institutions to disregard the disabilities of handicapped 
individuals or to make substantial modifications in their 
programs to allow disabled persons to participate. 
Instead, it requires only that an "otherwise qualified 
handicapped individual" not be excluded from participation 
in a federally funded program "solely by reason of his 
5. 
handicap," indicating only that mere possession of a 
handicap is not a permissible ground for assuming an 
inability to function in a particular context.~/ 
The court below, however, believed that the 
"otherwise qualified" persons protected by§ 504 include 
those who would be able to meet the requireme.1ts of a 
particular program in every respect except as to 
limitations imposed by their handicap. See 574 F.2d, at 
1160. Taken literally, this holding would prevent an 
institution from taking into account any limitation 
resulting from the handicap, however disabling. It 
assumes, in effect, that a person need not meet legitimate 
physical requirements in order to be "otherwise qualified." 
We think the understanding of the District Court is closer 
to the plain meaning of the statutory language. An 
otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all 
of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap. 
The regulations promulgated by the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW} to interpret§ 504 
reinforce, rather than contradict, this conclusion. 
According to these regulations, a "[q]ualified handicapped 
person" is, "[w]ith respect to postsecondary and vocational 
education services, a handicapped person who meets the 
academic and technical standards requisite to admission or 
participation in the [school's] education program or 
activity ..• II 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(3)(1978). An 
explanatory note states: 
6. 
"The term 'technical standards' refers to~ 
nonacademic admissions criteria that are essential 
to participation in the program in question." 45 
C.F.R. pt. 84, App. A, at p. 405 (emphasis 
supplied). 
A further note emphasizes that legitimate physical 
qualifications may be essential to participation in 
particular programs.]/ We think it clear, therefore, that 
HEW interprets the "other" qualifications which a 
handicapped perion may be required to meet as including 
necessary physical qualifications. 
III 
The remaining question is whether the physical 
qualifications Southeastern demanded of respondent might 
not be necessary for participation in its nursing program. 
It is not open to dispute that, as Southeastern's Associate 
Degree Nursing program currently is constituted, the 
ability to understand speech without reliance on lip-
reading is necessary for patient safety during the clinical 
phase of the program. As the district court found, this 
ability also is indispensable for many of the functions 
that a registered nurse performs. 
Respondent contends nevertheless that§ 504, 
properly interpreted, compels Southeastern to undertake 
affirmative action that would dispense with the need for 
effective oral communication. First, it is suggested that 
respondent can be given individual supervision by faculty 
members whenever she attends patients directly. Moreover, 
certain required courses might be dispensed with altogether 
7. 
for respondent. It is not necessary, she argues, that 
Southeastern train her to undertake all the tasks a 
registered nurse is licensed to perform. Rather, it is 
sufficient to make§ 504 ·applicable if respondent might be 
able to perform satisfactorily some of the duties of a 
registered nurse or to hold some of the positions available 
to a registered nurse.~/ 
Respondent finds support for this argument in 
portions of the HEW regulations discussed above. In 
particular, a provision applicable to postsecondary 
educational programs requires covered institutions to make 
"modifications'' in their programs to accommodate 
handicapped persons, and to provide "auxiliary aids" such 
as sign-language interpreters.~/ Respondent argues that 
this regulation imposes an obligation to ensure full 
participation in covered programs by handicapped 
individuals and, in particular, requires Southeastern to 
make the kind of adjustments that would be necessary to 
permit her safe participation in the nursing program. 
We note first that on the present record it 
appears unlikely respondent could benefit from any 
affirmative action that the regulation reasonably could be 
interpreted as requiring. Section 84.44(d)(2), for 
example, explicitly excludes "devices or services of a 
personal nature" from the kinds of auxilary aids a school 
must provide a handicapped individual. Yet the only. 
evidence in the record indicates that nothing less than 
8. 
close, individual attention by a nursing instructor would 
be sufficient to ensure patient safety if respondent took 
part in the clinical phase of the nursing program. See 424 
F. Supp., at 1346. Furthermore, it also is reasonably 
clear that§ 84.44(a) does not encompass the kind of 
curricular changes that would be necessary to accommodate 
respondent in the nursing program. In light of 
respondent's inability to function in clinical courses 
without close supervision, Southeastern with prud~nce could 
allow her to take only academic classes. Whatever benefits 
respondent might realize from such a course of study, she 
would not receive even a rough equivalent of the training a 
nursing program normally gives. Such a fundamental 
alteration in the nature of a program is far more than the 
"modification" the regulation requires. 
Moreover, an interpretation of the regulations 
that required the extensive modifications necessary to 
include respondent in the nursing program would raise grave 
doubts about their validity. If these regulations were to 
require substantial adjustments in existing programs beyond 
those necessary to eliminate discrimination against 
otherwise qualified individuals, they would do more than 
clarify the meaning of§ 504. Instead, they would 
constitute an unauthorized extension of the obligations 
imposed by that statute. 
The language and structure of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 reflect a recognition by Congress of the 
9. 
distinction between the even-handed treatment of qualified · 
handicapped persons and affirmative efforts to overcome the 
disabilities caused by handicaps. Section 501(b), 
governing the employm~nt of handicapped individuals by the 
federal government, requires each federal agency to submit 
"an affirmative action program plan for the hiring, 
placement, and advancement of h a ndicapped individuals 
" These plans "shall include a description of the extent 
to which and methods whereby the special needs of 
handicapped employees are being met." Similarly, § 503(a), 
governing hiring by federal contractors, requires employers 
to "take affirmative action to employ and advance in 
employment qualified handicapped individuals .••• " The 
President is required to promulgate regulations to enforce 
this section. 
Under§ 501(c) of the Act, by contrast, state 
agencies such as Southeastern are only "encourage[d] ••• 
to adopt such policies and procedures." Section 504 does 
not refer at all to affirmative action, and except as it 
applies to federal employers it does not provide for 
implementation by administrative action. A comparison of 
these provisions demonstrates that Congress understood 
accommodation of the needs of handicappe d individuals may 
require affirmative action and knew how to provide for it 
in those instances where it wished to do so._l2./ 
Although an agency's interpretation of the statute 
under which it operates is entitled to some deference, 
1 0. 
"this deference is cbnstrained by our obligation to honor 
the clear meaning of a statute, as revealed by its 
language, purpose and history." International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. , n. 20 (1979). 
Here neither the language, purpose, nor history of§ 504 
reveals an intent to impose an affirmative action 
obligation on all recipients of federal funds.l!_/ 
Accordingly, we hold that even if HEW has attempted to 
create such an obligation itself, it lacks the authority to 
do so. 
IV 
We do not suggest that the line between a lawful 
refusal to extend affirmative action and illegal 
discrimination against handicapped persons always will be 
clear. It is possible to envision situations where an 
insistence on continuing past requirements and practices 
might arbitrarily deprive genuinely qualified handicapped 
persons of the opportunity to participate in a covered 
program. Technological advances can be expected to enhance 
opportunities to rehabilitate the handicapped or otherwise 
to qualify them for some useful employment. Such advances 
also may enable attainment of these goals without imposing 
undue financial and administrative burdens upon a State. 
Thus situations may arise where a refusal to modify an 
existing program might become unreasonable and 
discriminatory. Identification of those instances where a 
refusal to accommodate the needs of a disabled person 
11. 
I 
amounts to discrimination against the handicapped continues 
to be an important responsibility of HEW. 
In this case, however, it is clear that 
Southeastern's unwillingness to make major adjustments in 
its nursing program does not constitute such 
discrimination. The uncontroverted testimony of several 
members of Southeastern's staff and faculty established 
that the purpose of its program was to train persons who 
could serve the nursing profession in all customary ways. 
See, ~.g;, App. 35a, 52a, 53a, 71a, 74a. This type of 
purpose, far from reflecting any animus against handicapped 
individuals, is shared by many if not most of the 
institutions that train persons to render professional 
service. It is undisputed that respondent could not 
participate in Southeastern's nursing program unless the 
standards were substantially lowered. Section 504 imposes 
no requirement upon an educational institution to lower or 
to effect substantial modifications of standards to 
accommodate a handicapped person. 
One may admire respondent's respondent's desir~ 
and determination to overcome her handicap, and there well 
may be various other types of services for which she can 
qualify. In this case, however, we hold that there was no 
violation of§ 504 when Southeastern concluded that 
respondent did not qualify for admission to its program. 
Nothing in the language or history of§ 504 reflects an 
intention to limit the freedom of an educational 
1 2. 
./ 
institution to require reasonable physical qualifications 
for admission to a clinical training program. Nor do we 
find any legislative intent to compel such an institution 
substantially to alter the requirements of its program to 
accommodate the needs of a particular applicant. 
V 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court 
below, and remand for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
So ·· ordered. 
1 3. 
FN1. 
1. McRee also wrote that respondent's hearing 
disability could preclude her practicing safely in "any setting" 
allowed by "a license as L[icensed] P[ractical] N[urse] ." App. 
132a. Respondent contends that inasmuch as she already was 
licensed as a practical nurse, McRee's opinion was inherently 
incredible. But the record indicates that respondent had "not 
worked as a practical nurse except to do a little bit of night 
duty," App. 32a, and had not done that for several years before 
applying to Southeastern. Accordingly, it is at least possible 
to infer that respondent in fact could not work safely as a 
practical nurse in spite of her license to do so. In any event, 
we note the finding of the district court that "a Licensed 
Practical Nurse, unlike a Licensed Registered Nurse, operates 
under constant supervision and is not allowed to perform medical 
tasks which require a great degree of technical sophistication." 
424 F. Supp. 1341, 1342-1343 (E.D.N.C. 1976). 
2. The statute provides in full: 
"No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in 
the United States, as defined in section 706(6) of 
this title, shall, solely by reason of his 
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, 
or be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance or - under 
any program or -acti~ity conducted -e_y any Executive 
agency or by the United States Postal Service. 
The ~ead o f each such agency shall promulgate such 
regula tions as may be necessary to carry out the 
amendments to this section made by the 
Reh abilitation, Comprehensive Services, and 
Developmental Di sab ilities Ac t of 1978. - Copies of 
any proposed regulation shall be submitted to 
appropriate authorizing committees of the 
Congress, and such regulation may take effect no 
ea~lier than the thirtieth day after the date on 
which such .regulation is so submitted to sue~ 
committees .n-
The italicized portion of the section was added by the 
Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental 
Disabilities Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2982. Respondent 
asserts no claim under this portion of the statute. 
3. The District Court also dismissed respondent's 
constitutional claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed that 
portion of the order, and respondent has not sought review 
of this ruling. 
4. Relying on the plain language of the Act, the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) at first 
did not promulgate any regulations to implement§ 504. In 
a subsequent suit against HEW, however, the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia held that 
Congress had intended regulations to be issued and ordered 
HEW to do so. Cherry v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp. 922 (1976). 
The ensuing regulations currently are embodied in 45 C.F.R. 
pt. 8 4. 
5. In addition to challenging the construction of 
§ 504 by the Court of Appeals, Southeastern also contends 
that respondent cannot seek judicial relief for violations 
of that statute in view of the absence of any express 
private right of action. Respondent asserts that whether 
or not§ 504 provides a private action, she may maintain 
her suit under 42 u.s.c. § 1983. In light of our 
disposition of this case on the merits, it is unnecessary 
to address these issues and we express no views on them. 
See Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 529-531 (1976); ~oor 
v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715 (1973); United 
C:+-=>t-oc: u l>.11n,::,nhlirk. 393 U.S. 348, 351-352 (1969). 
FN2. 
follows: 
6. The Act defines "handicapped individual" as 
"The term 'h andicapped individual' means any 
individual who (A) has a physical or mental 
disability which for such individual constitutes 
or results in a substantial handicap to employment 
and (B) can reasonably be expected to benefit in 
terms of employability from vocationa l 
rehabilitat ion services provided pursuant to 
subchapters I and III of this chapter. For the 
purposes of subchapters IV and V of this chapter, 
such term means any person who (A) has a physical 
or mental impairment which substantially limits 
one or more of such person's major life 
activities, (B) has a record of such an 
impairment, or (C) is regarded as having such an 
impairment." Section 7 of the Rehabilitation Act . 
of 1973, 87 Stat. 359, as amended, 88 Stat. 1619, 
89 Stat. 2, 29 U.S.C. § 706(6). 
' 
This definition comports with our understanding of§ 504. 
A person who has a record of or is regarded as having an 
impairment may at present have no actual incapacity at all. 
Such a person would be exactly the kind of individual who 
could be "otherwise qualified" to participate in covered 
programs. And a person who suffers from a limiting 
physical or mental impairment still may possess other 
abilities that permit him to meet the ~equirements of 
various programs. Thus it is clear that Congress included 
among the class of "handicapped" persons covered by§ 504 a 
range of individuals who could be "otherwise qualified." 
See S. Rep. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1974). 
7. The note states: 
"Paragraph (k) of§ 84.3 defines the term 
'qualified handicapped person.' Throughout the 
regulation, this term is used instead of the 
statutory term 'otherwise qualified handicapped 
person.' The Departme nt believes that the 
FN3. 
argument: 
omission of the word 'otherwise' is necessary in 
order to comport with the intent of the statute 
because, read literally, 'otherwise' qualified 
handicapped persons include persons who are 
qualified except for their handicap, rather than 
in spite of their handicap. Under such a literal 
reading, a blind person possessing all the 
qualifications for driving a bus except sight 
could be said to be 'otherwise qualified' for the 
job of driving. Clearly, such a result was not 
intended by Congress. In all other ~espects, the 
terms 'qualifi ed ' and 'otherwise qualified' are 
intended to be interchangeable." 45 C.F.R. pt. 
84, App. A, at p. 405. 
8. The court below adopted a portion of this 
"[Respondent's] ability to read lips aids her in 
overcoming her hearing disability; however, it 
was argued that in certain situations such as in 
an operating room environment where surgical masks 
are used, this ability would be unavailing to her. 
"Be that as it may, in the medical community, 
there does appear to be a number of settings in 
which the plaintiff could perform satisfactorily 
as an RN, such as in industry or perhaps a 
physician's office. Certainly [respondent] could 
be viewed as possessing extraordinary insight into 
the medical and emotional needs of those with 
hearing disabilities. 
"If [respondent] meets all the other criteria 
for admission in the pursuit of her RN career, 
under the relevant North Carolina statutes, N.C. 
Gen. St at . §§ 90-158, et. s~q., it should not be 
foreclosed to her simply because she may not be 
able to function effectively in all the roles 
which registered nurses may choose for their 
careers." 574 F.2d 1158, 1161 n.6 (4th Cir. 
1978). 
9. This regulation provides in full: 
"(a) Academic re~uir~ments. A recipient [of 
federal runds] tow 1ch thi s subpart applies shall 
make such modifications to its academic 
requirements as are necessary to ensure that such 
requirements do not discriminate or have the 
effect of discriminating, on the basis of 
handicap, against a qualified handicapped 
applicant or student. Academic requirements that 
the recipient can demonstrate are essential to the 
program of instruction being pursued by such 
FN4. 
student or to any directly related licensing 
requirement will not be regarded as discriminatory 
within the meaning of this section. Modifications 
may include changes in the length of time 
permitted for the completion of degree 
requirements, substitution of specific courses 
required for the completion of degree 
requirements, and adaptation of the manner in 
which specific courses are conducted. . . . . 
"(d) Auxiliary ai~s. (1) A recirient to which 
this subpart applies shall take such steps as are 
necessary to ensure that no handicapped student is 
denied the benefits of, excluded from 
participation in, or otherwise subjected to 
discrimination under the education program or 
activity operated by the recipient because of the 
absence of educational auxiliary aids for students 
with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills. 
"(2) Auxiliary aids may include taped texts, 
interpreters or other effective methods of making 
orally delivered materials available to students 
with hearing impairments, readers in libraries for 
students with visual impairments, classroom 
equipment adapted for use by students with manual 
impairments, and other similar services and 
actions. Recipients need not provide attendants, 
individually prescribed devices, readers for 
personal use or study, or other devices or 
services of a personal nature." 45 C.F.R. § 
84.44. 
10. Section 115(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1978 added to the 1973 Act a section authorizing grants to 
state units for the purpose of providing ''such information 
and technical assistance (including support personnel such 
as interpreters for the deaf) as may be necessary to assist 
those entities in complying with this Act, particularly the 
requirements of section 504." 92 Stat. 2971, codified at 
29 U.S.C. § 775. This provision recognizes that on 
occasion the elimination of discrimination might involve 
some costs; it does not imply that the refusal to 
undertake substantial chang es in a program by itself 
FN5. 
constitutes discrimination. Whatever effect the 
availability of these funds might have on ascertaining the 
existence of discrimination in some future case, no such 
funds were available to Southeastern at the time respondent 
sought admission to its nursing program. 
11. The Government, in a brief amicus curiae in 
support of respondent, cites a report of the Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on the 1974 
amendments to the 1973 Act and several statements by 
individual members of Congress during debate on the 1978 
amendments, some of which indicate a belief that§ 504 
requires affirmative action. See Brief for the Government 
as Amicus · Curiae 44-50. But these isolated statements by 
individual members of Congress or its committees, all made 
after the enactment of the statute under consideration, 
cannot substitute for a clear expression of legislative 
intent at the time of enactment. Quern v. Mandley, 436 
U.S. 725, 736 n. 10 (1978); Los Angeles Dept. of Water & 
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 714 (1978). Nor do these 
comments, none of which represents the will of Congress as 
a whole, constitute subsequent "legislation'' such as this 
Court might weigh in construing the meaning of an earlier 
enactment. Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co~ v. FCC, 395 U.S. 
367, 380-381 (1969). 
The Government also argues that various amendments 
to the 1973 Act contained in the Rehabilitation Act of 1978 
further reflect Congress' approval of the affirmative 
FN6. 
action obligation created by HEW's regulations. But the 
amendment most directly on point undercuts this position. 
In amending§ 504, Congress both extended that section's 
prohibition of discrimination to "any program or activity 
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States 
Postal Service" and authorized administrative regulations 
to implement only this amendment. See note 2 supra. Th~ 
fact that no other regulations were mentioned supports an 
inference that no others were approved. 
Finally, we note that the assertion by HEW of the 
authority to promulgate any regulations under§ 504 has 
been neither consistent nor longstanding. For the first 
three years after the section was enacted, HEW maintained 
the position that Congress had not intended any regulations 
to be issued. It altered its stand only after having been 
enjoined to do so. Seen. 4, supra. This fact 
substantially diminishes the deference to be given to HEW's 
present interpretation of the statute. See General 
Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1 976). 
12. Respondent contends that it is unclear 
whether North Carolina law requires a registered nurse to 
be capable of performing all functions open to that 
profession in order to obtain a license to practice, 
although McRee, the Executive Director of the state Board 
of Nursing, had informed Southeastern that the law did so 
require. See App. 138a-139a. Respondent further argues 
that even if she is not capable of meeting North Carolina's 
present licensing requirements, she still might succeed in 
AhrAininn M 1i~PnSP in another iurisdiction. 
FN7. 
Respondent's argument misses the point. 
Southeastern's program, structured to train persons who 
will be able to perform all normal roles of a registered 
nurse, represents a legitimate academic policy, and is 
accepted by the State. Even if the licensing requirements 
of North Carolina or some other State are less demanding, 
nothing in the Act requires an edµc at ional institution to 
lower its standards. 
FN8. 
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1A.e, --- 11,,_;:_, £..,....- ,Jti,n ~~-
.hprtmt (!Ittnrt ttf flrt ~h f!>mu/ -- --~ -
'Jfa.sfrittghm. !J. Q}. 2llffe'!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. May 31, 1979 ✓ 
RE: No. 78-711 Southeastern Community Colleoe v. Davis 
Dear Lewis: 
I confess to very considerable reluctance to join 
your result but I see no way out. Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
/kJ 
- -
.§u.µrnttt ~.ttttrt of tlµ 'Jfutfuh ~huts 
~asfrin:gtcn. ~- <4. 2.0ffe~c'.} 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE May 31, 1979 
Re: 78-711 - Southeastern Community College 
v. Davis 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
cmc 
Sincerely yours, 





j5nprtutt (!fl1Url ttf tlrt ~b j5hdts 
Jf aidpnghm. ~. <ij. 2!1&,'1-, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART May 31, 1979 
✓ 
Re: 78-711 - Southeastern Community College v. 
Davis 
Dear Lewis: 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court. 
Mr. Justice Powell 





J;nputttt (!Icmi itf fltt ~~ j;taf.tg 
jirasfr:ttg~ ~- <!I- 2llffe~, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST / 
May 31, 1979 
Re: No. 78-711 - Southeastern Community College v. Davis 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely✓ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Just10P- Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
I; 7/3// 
Mr. Justice Whlte 
Mr. Just 1 c.,-. 'lh~ ·rsha.11 
Mr. Just1ce Blaclrmun 
Mr. Justice Rr-1-tr"o ,, s t 
Mr. Juati.ce Stevt::'1 S 
From : Mr. Justice Powell 
Ci rculat ed : 1 JUN 1979 
1st PRINTED DRAFT Rec1roulat ad: ______ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF 'THE UNITED STATES 
No. 78-711 
Southeastern Community Col-1 On Writ of Certiorari to the 
lege, Petitioner, United States Court of Ap-
v. peals for the Fourth Circuit. 
Frances B. Davis. 
[June - , 1979] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents a matter of first impression for this 
Court: Whether § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 
which prohibits discrimination against an "otherwise qualified 
handicapped individual" in federally funded programs "solely 
by reason of his handicap," forbids professional schools from 
imposing physical qualifications for admission to their clinical 
training programs. 
I 
Respondent, who suffers from a serious hearing disability, 
seeks to be trained as a registered nurse. During the 1973-
1974 academic year she was enrolled in the College Parallel 
program of Southeastern Community College, a sta.te institu-
tion that receives federal funds. Respondent hoped to prog-
ress to Southeastern 's Associate Degree Nursing program, 
completion of which would make her eligible for state certifi-
cation as a registered nurse. In the course of her application 
to the nursing program, she was interviewed by a member of 
the nursing faculty. It became apparent that respondent had 
difficulty understanding questions asked, and on inquiry she 
acknowledged a history of hearing problems and dependence 
on a hearing aid. She was advised to consult an audiologist. 
On the basis of an examination 'I. Duke University Medical 
L1tt 
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Center, respondent was diagnosed as having a "bilateral, 
sensori-neural hearing loss." App. 127a. A change in her 
hearing aid was recommended, as a result of which it was 
expected that she would be able to detect sounds "almost as 
well as a person would who has normal hearing." App. 127a-
128a. But this improvement would not mean that she could 
discriminate among sounds sufficiently to understand normal 
spoken speech. Her lipreading skills would remain necessary 
for effective communication : "While wearing the hearing aid, 
she is well aware of gross sounds occurring in the listening 
environment. However, she can only be responsible for 
speech spoken to her, when the talker gets her attention and 
allows her to look directly at the talker." App. 128a. 
Southeastern next consulted Mary McRee, Executive Direc-
tor of the North Carolina Board of Nursing. On the basis 
of the audiologist's report, McRee recommended that respond-
ent not be admitted to the nursing program. In McRee's 
view, respondent's hearing disability made it unsafe for her 
to practice as a nurse.1 In addition, it would be impossible 
for respondent to participate safely in the normal clinical 
training program, and those modifications that would be· 
necessary to enable safe participation would prevent her from 
realizing the benefits of the program: "To adjust patient 
1 McRee also wrote that respondent's hearing disability could preclude 
her practicing safely in ·'any setting" allowed by "a license as L[icensedJ 
P[ractical] N[urse]." App. 132a. Respondent contends that inasmuch 
as she already was licensed as a practical nurse, McRee's opinion was in-
herently incredible. But the record indicates that respondent had "not 
worked as a practical nurse except to do a little bit of night duty," App. 
32a, and had not done that for 8everal years before applying to South-
eastern. Accordingly, it is at least possible to infer that respondent in 
fact could not work safely as a practical nurse in spite of her license to 
do so. In any event , we note the finding of the District Court that "a 
Licensed Practical Nurse, unlike a Licensed Registered Nurse, operates 
under constant supervision and is not allowed to perform medical tasks 
which require a great degree of technical sophistication." 424 F . Supp .. 
13,41, 13Ji,2.-l343; (EDNC 1976) " 
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learning experiences in keeping with [respondent's] hearing 
limitations could, in fact, be the same as denying her full 
learning to meet the objectives of your nursing programs." 
App. 132a-133a. 
After respondent was notified that she was not qualified for 
nursing study because of her hearing disability, she requested 
reconsideration of the decision. The entire nursing staff of 
Southeastern was assembled, and McRee again was consulted. 
McRee repeated her conclusion that on the basis of the avail-
able evidence, respondent "has hearing limitations which 
could interfere with her safely caring for patients." App. 
139a. Upon further deliberation, the staff voted to deny 
respondent admission. 
Respondent then filed suit in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, alleging 
both a violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 
Stat. 394, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 794,2 and a denial of equal 
protection and due process. After a bench trial, the District 
Court entered judgment in favor of Southeastern. 424 F. 
Supp. 1341 (1976). It confirmed the findings of the audi-
1 The statute provides in full : 
"No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as 
defined in section 706 (6) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handi-
cap, be excluded from the participation in, or be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted 
by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal, Service . The 
head of each such agency shal,l promulgate such regulations as may be nec-
essary to carry out the amendments to this section made by the Rehabilita-
tion. Comprehensive Services, and DPvPlopmentaJ, Disabilities Act of 1978. 
Copies of any proposed regulation shal,l be submitted to appropriate au-
thorizing committees of the Congress, and such regulation may take effect 
no earlier than the thirtieth day after the date on which such regul,ation 
is S'J submit~ed to such committees." 
The italicized portion of the section was added by the Rehabilitation, Com-
prehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 
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ologist that even with a hearing aid respondent cannot under-
stand speech directed to her except through lipreading, and 
further found that, 
"[I]n many situations such as an operation room, inten-
sive care unit, or post-natal care unit, all doctors and 
nurses wear surgical masks which would make lip-reading 
impossible. Additionally, in many situations a Regis-
tered Nurse would be required to instantly follow the 
physician's instructions concerning procurement of vari-
ous types of instruments and drugs where the physician 
would be unable to get the nurse's attention by other 
than vocal means." Id., at 1343. 
Accordingly, the Court concluded that : 
"[Respondent's] handicap actually prevents her from 
safely performing in both her training program and her 
proposed profession. The trial testimony indicated 
numerous situations where [respondent's] particular dis-
ability would render her unable to function properly. Of 
particular concern to the court in this case is the potential 
danger to future patients in such situations." Id., at 
1345. 
Based on these findings, the District Court concluded that 
respondent was not an "otherwise qualified handicapped in-
dividual" protected against discrimination by § 504. In its 
view, "[o]therwise qualified, can only be read to mean other-
wise able to function sufficiently in the position sought in 
spite of the handicap, if proper training and facilities are 
suitable and available." Ibid. Because respondent's disabil-
ity would prevent her from functioning "sufficiently" in 
Southeastern's nursing program, the Court held that the deci-
sion to exclude her was not discriminatory within the meaning 
of § 504.3 
3 The District Court also dismissed respondent's constitutional claims. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed that portion of the order, and respondent 
has not sought review of thie ruling. 
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
reversed. 574 F. 2d 1158 (1978). It did not dispute the 
District Court's findings of fact, but held that the Court had 
misconstrued § 504. In light of administrative regulations 
that had been promulgated while the appeal was pending, see 
42 Fed. Reg. 22676 (May 4, 1977),4 the appellate court be-
lieved that § 504 required Southeastern to "reconsider plain-
tiff's application for admission to the nursing program without 
regard to her hearing ability." Id. , at 1160. It concluded 
that the District Court had erred in taking respondent's 
handicap into account in determining whether she was "other-
wise qualified" for the program, rather than confining its 
lnquiry to her "academic and technical qualifica.tions." Id., 
at 1161. The Court of Appeals also suggested that § 504 
required "affirmative conduct" on the part of Southeastern to 
modify its program to accommodate the disabilities of appli-
cants, "even when such modifications become expensive." 
Id., at 1162. 
Because of the importance of this issue to the many insti-
tutions covered by § 504, we granted certiorari. 439 U.S. -
(1979). We now reverse.5 
4 Relying on the plain language of the Act, the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) at first did not promulgate any regulations 
to implement § 504. In a subsequent suit against HEW, however, the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that Con-
gress had intended regulations to be issued and ordered HEW to do so. 
Cherry v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp. 922 (1976) . The ensuing regulations 
currently are embodied in 45 CFR pt. 84. 
5 In addition to challenging the construction of § 504 by the Court of 
Appeals, Southeastern also contends that respondent cannot seek judicial 
relief for violations of that statute in view of the absence of any express 
private i·ight of action. Respondent asserts that whether or not § 504 
provides a private action, she may maintain her suit under 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1983. In light of our disposition of this case on the merits, it is unnec-
essary to address these issues and we express no views on them. See 
Norton v. Mathews, 427 U. S. 524, 529-531 (1976) ; Moor v. County of 
Alameda, 411 U. S. 693, 715 (1973); United States v. Augenblick, ,39~ 
u. s. 3481351-352 (1969). 
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II 
This is the first case in which this Court has been called 
upon to interpret § 504. It is elementary that ",[t]he 
starting point in every case involving the construction of a 
statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring); see Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 
U. S. 322, 330 ( 1978); Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 
U. S. 462, 472 (1977). Section 504 by its terms does not 
compel educational institutions to disregard the disabilities 
of handicapped individuals or to make substantial modifica-
tions in their programs to allow disabled persons to partici-
pate. Instead, it requires only that an "otherwise qualified 
handicapped individual" not be excluded from participation 
in a federally funded program "solely by reason of his handi-
cap," indicating only that mere possession of a handicap is 
not a permissible ground for assuming an inability to function 
in a particular context.6 
11 The Act defines "handcapped individual" as follows: 
"The t erm 'handicapped individual' means any individual who (A) has-a 
physical or mental disability which for such individual constitutes or re-
sults in a substantial handicap t o employment and (B) can reasonably 
be expected to benefit in terms of employability from vocational rehabili-
tation services provided pursuant to subchapters I and III of this chapter. 
For the purposes of subchapters IV and V of this chapter, such term 
means any person who (A) has a physical or mental impairment which 
substanially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (B) 
has a record of such an impairment, or (C) is regarded as having such an 
impairment ." Section 7 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 359', 
as amended, 88 Stat. 1619, 89 Stat . 2, 29 U.S. C. § 706 (6) . 
This definition comports with our understanding of § 504. A person who 
has a record of or is regarded as having an impairment may at present 
have no actual incapacity at all. Such a person would be exactly the 
kind of individual who could be "otherwise qualified" to participate in 
covered programs. And a person who suffers from a limiting phy_sical or 
mental impairment still may possess ot her abilities that permit him to meet 
the req_uirements of va.rjous programs. Thus it · is clear that ·Congress 
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The court below, however, believed that the "otherwise 
qualified" persons protected by § 504 include those who would 
be able to meet the requirements of a particular program in 
every respect except as to limitations imposed by their handi-
cap. See 574 F. 2d, at 1160. Taken literally, this holdin·g 
would prevent an institution from taking into account any 
limitation resulting from the han-dicap, however disabling. 
It assumes, in effect, that a person need not meet legitimate 
physical requirements in order to be "otherwise qualified . '" 
·we think the understanding of the ·District Court is closer 
to the plain meaning of the statutory language. An otherwise 
qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's 
requirements in spite of his handicap. 
The regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, 
"Education, and Welfare (HEW) to interpret § 504 reinforce, 
rather than contradict, this conclusion. According to these 
regulations, a " [ q] ualified handicapped person" is, " [ w] ith 
respect to postsecondary and vocational education services, a 
handicapped person who meets the academic and technical 
standards requisite to admission or participation in the 
'[school's] education program or activity .... " 45 CFR 
§ 84.3 (k)(3) (1978). An expla1'~ry note states: 
"The term 'technical standards' refers to all nonacademic 
admissions criteria that are essential to participation in 
the program in question." 45 CFR pt. 84, App. A, at p. 
405 (emphasis supplied ). 
A further note emphasizes that legitimate physical qualifica-
tions may be essential to participation in particular programs.' 
included among the class of "handicapped" persons covered by § 504 a 
range of individuals who could be "otherwise qualified." See S. Rep. No. 
1297, 93d Cong., 2d Ses:,;., 38-39 (1974). 
7 The note states: 
"Paragraph (k) of § 84.3 defines the term 'qualified handicapped person.' 
Throughout the regulat ion, this term is used instead of the statutory term 
'otherwise qualified handicapped .person.' The Department believes that 
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We think it clear, therefore, that HEW interprets the "other" 
qualifications which a handicapped person may be required to 
meet as including necessary physical qualifications. 
III 
The remaining question is whether the physical qualifica-
tions Southeastern demanded of respondent might not be 
necessary for participation in its nursing program. It is not 
open to dispute that, as Southeastern's Associate Degree 
Nursing program currently is constituted, the ability to under-
stand speech without reliance on lipreading is necessary for 
patient safety during the clinical phase of the program. As 
the District Court found, this ability also is indispensable for 
many of the functions that a registered nurse performs. 
Respondent contends nevertheless that§ 504, properly inter-
preted, compels Southeastern to undertake affirmative action 
that would dispense with the need for effective oral communi-
cation. First. it is suggested that respondent can be given 
individual supervision by faculty members whenever she at-
tends patients directly. Moreover. certain required courses 
might be dispensed with altogether for respondent. It is not 
necessary, she argues, that Southeastern train her to undertake 
all the tasks a registered nurse is licensed to perform. Rather, 
it is sufficient to make § 504 applicable if respondent might 
be able to perform satisfactorily some of the duties of a regis-
the omission of the word 'otherwise' is necessary in order to comport with 
the intent of the sta tute because, read literally, 'otherwise' qualified handi-
capped persons include persons who are qualified except for their handicap, 
rather than in spite of their handicap. Under such a literal reading, a 
blind person possessing all the qualifications for driving a bus except sight 
could be said to be 'otherwise qualified' for t he job of driving. Clearly, 
such a result was not intei1ded by Congress. In all other respects, the 
terms 'qualified' and 'otherwise qualified' are intended to be· interchange-
able;' -45 CFR pt. 84, App. A, at p . 405. 
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tered nurse or to hold some of the positions available to a 
registered nurse.8 
Respondent finds support for this argument in portions of 
the HEW regulations discussed above. In particular, a provi-
sion applicable to postsecondary educational programs requires 
covered institutions to make "modifications" in their programs 
to accommodate handicapped persons, and to provide "auxil-
iary aids" such as sign-language interpreters.9 Respondent 
8 The court below adopted a portion of this :irgument: 
" [R espondent's] ability to read lips aids her in overcoming her hearing 
disability ; however, it was a rgued that in certain situations such as in 
an operating room environment where surgical masks are used, this ability 
would be unavailing to her . 
''Be that as it may, in the medical community, there does appear to be a 
number of settings in which the plaintiff could perform satisfactorily as an 
R N, such as in industry or perhaps a physician's office. Certainly [re-
spondent] could be viewed as possessing extraordinary insight, into the 
medical and emotional needs of those with hearing disabilities. 
"If [respondent] meet:; all the other criteria for admission in the pursuit 
of her RN career, under the relevant North Carolina statutes, N . C. Gen. 
Stat. §§ 9'0-158, et seq ., it should not be foreclosed to her simply because 
she may not be able to function effectively in all the roles which registered 
nurses may choose for their careers." 574 F. 2d 1158, 1161 n . 6 (CA4 
1978) . 
9 This regulation provides in full : 
" (a) Acaderni,c requirem ents. A recipient [of federal funds] to which 
this subpart applies shall make such modifications to its academic require-
ments as are necessa ry to ensure that such requirements do not discrimi-
nate or have the effect of discriminating, on the basis of handicap, against 
a qualified handicapped applicant or student. Academic requirements that 
the recipient can demonstrate are essent ial to the program of instruction 
being pursued by such student or t6 any directly related licensing require-
ment will not be regarded as discriminatory within the meaning of this 
section . Modifications may include changes in the length of time per-
mitted for the completion of degree requirements, substit ution of specific 
courses required for the completion of degree requirements, and adapta-
tion of the manner in which specific courses are conducted. 
. . 
·" (d) -Auxiliary -aids. (1 ) A -recipient to which this suqpa rt applies shall 
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argues that this regulation imposes an obligation to ensure full 
participation in covered programs by handicapped individuals 
and, in particular, requires Southeastern to make the kind of 
adjustments that would be necessary to permit her safe 
participation in the nursing program. 
We note first that on the present record it appears unlikely 
respondent could benefit from any affirmative action that the 
regulation reasonably could be interpreted as requiring. Sec-
tion 84.44 ( d) (2). for example, explicitly excludes "devices or 
services of a personal nature" from the kinds of auxiliary aids 
a school must provide a handicapped individual. Yet the only 
evidence in the record iridicates that nothing less than close, 
individual attention by a nursing instructor would be sufficient 
to ensure patient safety if respondent took part in the clinical 
phase of the nursing program. See 424 F. Supp., at 1346. 
J?urthermore, it also is reasonably clear that § 84.44 (a) does 
not encompass the kind of curricular changes that would be 
necessary to accommodate respondent in the nursing program. 
In light of respondent's inability to function in clinical courses 
without close supervision, Southeastern with prudence could 
allow her to take only academic classes. Whatever benefits 
respondent might realize from such a course of study, she 
would not receive even a rough equivalent of the training a 
nursing program normally gives. Such a fundamental altera-
take such steps as are necessary to ensure that no handicapped student is 
denied the benefit s of, excluded from participation in , or otherwise sub-
jected to discrimination under the education program or activity operated 
by the recipient because of t he absence of educat ional auxiliary aids for 
students with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills. 
" (2) Auxiliary · aids may include taped texts, interpreters or other 
effective methods of making orally delivered materials available to stu-
dents with hearing impairments, readers in libraries for students with 
visual impairments, classroom equi pment adapted for use by students with 
manual impairments, and other similar services and actions. Recipients 
need not provide attendants, individually presc ribed devices, readers for 
personal use or study, or other device:,; or services of a personal nature:'' 
45 CF,R § 84.44. 
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tion in the nature of a program is far more than the "modifica-
tion" the regulation requires. 
Moreover, an interpretation of the regulations that required 
the extensive modifications necessary to include respondent in 
the nursing program would raise grave doubts about their 
·validity. If these regulations were to require substantial ad-
justments in existing programs beyond those necessary to elim-
inate discrimination against otberwise qualified individuals, 
they would do more than clarify the meaning of § 504. In-
stead, they would constitute an unauthorized extension of the 
obligations imposed by that statute. 
The language and structure 1,f the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 reflect a recognition by Congress of the distinction be-i 
tween the evenhanded treatment of qualified handicapped 
persons and affirmative efforts to overcome the disabilities 
caused by handicaps. Section 501 (b), governing the employ. 
ment of handicapped individuals by the Federal Government, 
requires each federal agency to submit "an affirmative action 
program plan for the hiring, placement, and advancement 0£ 
handicapped individuals .... " These plans "shall include 
a description of the extent to which and methods whereby the 
special needs of handicapped employees are being met." 
Similarly, § 503 (a), governing hiring by federal contractors, 
requires employers to "take affirmative action to employ and 
advance in employment qualified handicapped individ-
uals .... " The President is required to promulgate regula-
tions to enforce this section. 
Under § 501 (c) of the Act, by contrast, state agencies such 
as Southeastern are only "encourage[d] ... to adopt such-
policies and procedures." Section 504 does not refer at all to 
affirmative action ; and except as it applies to federal em-
ployers it does not provide for implementation by administra-
tive action . A comparison of these provisions demonstrates 
that Congress understood accommodation of the needs of 
handicapped individuals may require affirmative action and 
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knew how to provide for it in those instances where it wished 
to do so.10 
Although an agency's interpretation of the statute under 
which is operates is entitled to some deference, "this deference 
is constrained by our obligation to honor the clear meaning 
of a statute, as revealed by its language, purpose and history." 
International Brotherhood of Tf!J,msters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 
-, - n. 20 (1979). Here neither the language, purpose, 
nor history of § 504 reveals an intent to impose an affirmative 
action obligation on all recipients of federal funds.11 Accord-
10 Section 115 (a) of the Rehabilitation Act of Hl78 added to the 19-73 
Act a section authorizing grants to state units for the purpose of provid-
ing "such information and technical assistance · (including support. per-
sonnel such as interpreters for the deaf) as may be necessary to assist 
those entities in complying with this Act, particularly the requirements of 
section 504." 92 Stat. 2971, codified at 29 U.S. C. § 775. This provision 
recognizes that on occasion the elimination of discrimination might involve 
some costs; it does not imply that the refusal to undertake substantial 
changes in a program by itself constitutes discrimination. Whatever effect 
the availability of these funds might have on ascertaining the existence of 
discrimination in some future case, no such funds were available to South-
eastern at the time respondent sought admission to its nursing program. 
11 The Government, in a brief amicus curiae in support of respondent, 
cites a report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on 
the 1974 amendments to the 1973 Act and several statements by individual 
Members of Congress during debate on the 1978 amendments, some of 
which indicate a belief that § 504 requires affirmative action. See Brief 
for the Government as Amicus Cuiiae 44-50. But these · isolated state-
ments by individual Members of Congress or its committees, all made 
after the enactment of the statute under consideration, cannot substitute 
for a clear expression of legislative intent at the time of enactment .. 
Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 736 n. 10 (1978); Los Angeles Dept. of 
Water & Power v. Manhart , 435 U. S. 702, 714 (1978). Nor do these 
comments, none of which represents the will of Congress as a whole, con-
stitute subsequent '· legi:slation" such as this Court might weigh in con-
struing the meaning of an earlier enactment. Cf. R ed Lion Broadcasting 
' Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 38~381 (1969) . 
The Government also argues that various amendments to the 1973 Act 
contained in the Rehabilitation Act of 1978 -further reflect Congress' ap-· 
~ 
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ingly, we hold that even if HEW has attempted to create such 
an obligation itself, it lacks the authority to do so. 
IV 
We do not suggest that the line between a lawful refusal 
to extend affirmative action and illegal discrimination against 
handicapped persons always will be clea.r. It is possible to 
envision situations where an insistence on continuing past 
requirements and practices might arbitrarily deprive genuinely 
qualified handicapped persons of the opportunity to partici-
pate in a covered program. Technological advances can be 
expected to enhance opportunities to rehabilitate the handi-
capped or otherwise to qualify them for some useful employ-
ment. Such advances also may enable attainment of these 
goals without imposing undue financial and administrative 
burdens upon a State. Thus situations may arise where a 
refusal to modify an existing program might become unrea.-
sona:ble and discriminatory. Identification of those instances 
where a refusal to accommodate the needs of a disabled person 
amounts to discrimination against the handicapped continues 
to be an important responsibility of HEW. 
proval of the affirmative action obligation created by HEW's regulations. 
But the amendment most directly on point undercuts this position. In 
a.mending § 504, Congress both extended that section's prohibition of dis-
criminat ion to "any program or activity conducted by any Executive 
agenc)' or b)· the United States Postal Service" and authorized administra-
tive regulations to implement on!)' this amendment . See u . 2, supra. 
The fact tha; uo other regnlations were mentioned supports an inference 
that no other" were upproved. 
Finally, we note that the assertion by HEW of the authority to promul-
gate any regulations under § 504 has been neither consistent uor long-
standing. For the first three years after the section was enacted, HEW 
maintained the position that Congress had not intended any regulati9ns 
to be issued. It altered it;; stand only after having been enjoined to do 
so. See n. 4, supra. This fa ct sub:;tantially diminishes the deference to 
be givrn to HEW'~ present interpretation of the statute. See Geneml 
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In this case. however, it is clear that Southeastern's unwill..J 
ingness to make major adjustments in its nursing program 
does not constitute such discrimination. The urrcontroverted 
testimony of several members of Southeastern's staff and 
faculty established that the purpose of its program was to 
train persons who could serve the nursing profession in all 
customary ways. See, e. g., App. 35a. 52a, 53a, 71a, 74a. 
This type of purpose, far from reflecting any animus against 
handicapped individuals_. is shared by many if not most of the 
institutions that train persons to render professional service. 
It is undisputed that respondent could not participat-e in 
Southeastern's nursing program unless the standards were 
substantially lowered. Section 504 imposes no requirement 
upon an educational institution to lower or to effect substa.n-
tial modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped 
1,)... person.JI , 
One may admire respondent's desire and determination to 
overcome her handicap, and there well may be various other 
types of se~ for which she can qualify. In this case, 
however, we old that there was no violation of § 504 when 
Southeastern concluded that respondent did not qualify for 
admission to its program. Nothing in the language or history 
of § 504 reflects an intention to limit the freedom of an educa-
12 Respondmt contends that it is m1clear whether North Carolina law 
requires a regi~tered. nurse to be capable of performing a.I! functions open 
to that profession in order to obtain a license to practice, although McRee, 
the Exf'cutive Director of the state Board of Nursing, had ·informed South-
eastern that the law did so require. See App. 138a-139a. Respondent 
further argues that even if she is not capable of meeting North Carolina's 
present licf'nsing requirements, she still might succeed in obtaining a license 
in another juri,::diction. 
Respondent 's argument misses tlie point. Southeastern's program, struc-
tured to train persons who will be able to perform all norma:l roles of a 
registered nurse, represf'nts a legitimate academic policy, and is accepted 
by the State. Even if the licensing rf'quirements of North Carolina or 
some other State are less demanding, nothing in the Act requires an edtL-· 
cational institution to lower its standards. 
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tional institution to require reasonable physical qualifications 
for admission to a clinical training program. Nor do we find 
any legislative intent to compel such an institution substan-
tially to alter the requirements of its program to accommodate 
the needs of a particular applicant. 
V 
Accordingly, we reserve the judgment of the court below, 
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MR. JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. ~ ? t!9-,_,f--
~ T ~ This case presents a matter of first impression for this 
Court: Whether § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 
which prohibits discrimination against an "otherwise qualified 
handicapped individual" in federally funded programs "solely 
by reason of his handicap," forbids professional schools from 
imposing physical qualifications for admission to their clinical 
training programs. 
I 
Respondent, who suffers from a serious hearing disability, 
seeks to be trained as a registered nurse. During the 1973-
1974 academic year she was enrolled in the College Parallel 
program of Southeastern Community College, a state institu-
tion that receives federal funds. Respondent hoped to prog-
ress to Southeastern's Associate Degree Nursing program, 
completion of which would make her eligible for state certifi-
cation as a registered nurse. In the course of her application 
to the nursing program, she was interviewed by a member of 
the nursing faculty. It became apparent that respondent had 
difficulty understanding questions asked, and on inquiry she 
acknowledged a history of hearing problems and dependence 
on a hearing aid. She was advised to consult an audiologist. 
On the basis of an examination at Duke University Medical 
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Center, respondent was diagnosed as having a "bilateral, 
sensori-neural hearing loss." App. 127a. A change in her 
hearing aid was recommended, as .a result of which it was 
expected that she would be able to detect sounds "almost as 
well as a person would who has normal hearing." App. 127a-
128a. But this improvement would not mean that she could 
discriminate among sounds sufficiently to understand normal 
spoken speech. Her lipreading skills would remain necessary 
for effective communication : "While wearing the hearing aid, 
she is well aware of gross sounds occurring in the listening 
environment. However, she can only be responsible for 
speech spoken to her, when the talker gets her attention and 
allows her to look directly at the talker." App. 128a. 
Southeastern next consulted Mary McRee, Executive Direc-
tor of the North Carolina Board of Nursing. On the basis 
of the audiologist's report, McRee recommended that respond:.. 
ent not be admitted to the nursing program. In McRee's 
view, respondent's hearing disability made it unsafe for her 
to practice as a nurse.1 In addition,· it would be impossible· 
for respondent to participate safely in the normal clinical 
training program, and those modifications that would be 
necessary to enable safe participation would prevent her from 
realizing the benefits of the program : "To adjust patient 
1 McRee also wrote that respondent 's hearing disability could preclude 
her practicing safely in "any setting" allowed by "a license as L[icensedJ 
P[ractical] N[urse]." App. 132a . Respondent contends that inasmuch 
as she already was licensed as a practical nurse, McRee's opinion was in-
herently increilible. But the record indicates that respondent had "not 
worked as a practical nurse except to do a little bit of night duty," App .. 
32a, and had not done that for several years before applying to South-
eastern. Accordingly, it is at least possible to infer that respondent in 
fact could not work safely as a practical nurse in spite of her license to 
do so. In any event, we note the finding of the District Court that "a 
Licensed Practical Nurse, unlike a Licensed Registered Nurse, operates 
under constant supervision and is not allowed to perform medical tasks 
which require a great degree of technical sophistication." 424 F . Supp_ 
1341, 1342-1343, (EDNC 1976). 
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learning experiences in keeping with [respondent's] hearing 
limitations could, in fact, be the same as denying her full 
learning to meet the objectives of your nursing programs." 
App. 132a-133a. 
After respondent was notified that she was not qualified for 
nursing study because of her hearing disability, she requested 
reconsideration of the decision. The entire nursing sta.ff of 
Southeastern was assembled, and McRee again was consulted. 
McRee repeated her conclusion that on the basis of the avail-
able evidence, respondent "has hearing limitations which 
could interfere with her safely caring for patients." App. 
139a. Upon further deliberation, the staff voted to deny 
respondent admission. 
Respondent then filed suit in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, alleging 
both a violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 
Stat. 394, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 794,2 and a denial of equal 
protection and due process. After a bench trial, the District 
Court entered judgment in favor of Southeastern. 424 F. 
Supp. 1341 (1976). It confirmed the findings of the audi-
2 The statute provides in full : 
"No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as 
defined in section 706 (6) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handi-
cap, be excluded from the participation in , or be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted 
by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service. The 
head of each such agency shall promulgate such regulations as may be nec-
essary to carry out the amendments to this section made by the Rehabilita-
tion, Comprehensive Services, and Drv qlopmental Disabilities Act of 1978. 
Copies of any proposed regulation shall be submitted to appropriate au-
thorizing committees of the Congress, and such regulation may take effect 
no earlier than the thirtieth day after the elate on which such regulation 
is S'.1 submitted to such committees." 
The italicized portion of the section was added bv the Rehabilitation, Com-
prehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 
2982. Respondent asserts no claim under this portion of the statttte. 
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ologist that even with a hearing aid respondent cannot under-
stand speech directed to her except through lipreading, and 
further found that, 
H[I]n many situations such as an operation room, inten-
sive care unit, or post-natal care unit, all doctors and 
nurses wear surgical masks which would make lip-reading 
impossible. Additionally, in many situations a Regis-
tered Nurse would be required to instantly follow the 
physician's instructions concerning procurement of vari-
ous types of instruments and drugs where the physician 
would be unable to get the nurse's attention by other 
than vocal means." Id. , at 1343. 
Accordingly, the Court concluded that : 
"[Respondent's] handicap actually prevents her from 
safely performing in bot}i. her training program and her 
proposed profession. The trial testimony indicated 
numerous situations where [respondent's] particular dis-
ability would render her unable to function properly. Of 
particular concern to the court in this case is the potential 
danger to future patients in such situations." Id. , at 
1345. 
Based on these findings, the District Court concluded that 
respondent was not an "otherwise qualified handicapped in-
dividual" protected against discrimination by § 504. In its 
view, "[o]therwise qualified, can only be read to mean other-
wise able to function sufficiently in the position sought in 
spite of the handicap, if proper training and facilities are 
suitable and available." Ibid. Because respondent's disabil-
ity would prevent her from functioning "sufficiently" in 
Southeastern's nursing program, the Court held that the deci-
sion to exclude her was not discriminatory within the meaning 
of § 504.1 
3 The District Court also dismissed respondent 's constitutional claims. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed that portion of the order, and respondent 
has not sought review of this ruling. 
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
reversed. 574 F. 2d 1158 (1978). It did not dispute the 
District Court's findings of fact, but held that the Court had 
misconstrued § 504. In light of administrative regulations 
that had been promulgated while the appeal was pending, see 
42 Fed. Reg. 22676 (May 4, 1977) ,4 the appellate court be-
lieved that § 504 required Southeastern to "reconsider plain-
tiff's application for admission to the nursing program without 
regard to her hearing ability." Id., at 1160. It concluded 
that the District Court had erred in taking respondent's 
handicap into account in determining whether she was "other-
wise qualified" for the program, rather than confining its 
· inquiry to her "academic and technical qualifica.tions." Id., 
at 1161. The Court of Appeals also suggested that § 504 
required "affirmative conduct" on the part of Southeastern to 
modify its program to accommodate the disabilities of appli-
cants, "even when such modifications become expensive." 
Id., at 1162. 
Because of the importance of this issue to the many insti-
tutions covered by § 504, we granted certiorari. 439 U.S. -
(1979). We now reverse.5 
4 Relying on the plain language of the Act, the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) at first did not promulgate any regulations 
to implement § 504. In a subsequent suit against HEW, however, the 
United States District Court for the Dist rict of Columbia held that Con-
gress had intended regulations to be issued and ordered HEW to do so. 
Cherry v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp. 922 (1976) . The ensuing regulations 
currently are embodied in 45 CFR pt. 84. 
5 In addition to challenging the construction of § 504 by the Court of 
Appeals, Southeastern also contends that respondent cannot seek judicial 
relief for violations of that statute in view of the absence of any express 
private right of action. Respondent asserts that whether or not § 504 
provides a private action, she may maintain her suit under 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1983. In light of our disposition of this case on the merits, it is unnec-
essary to address these issues and we express no views on them. See 
Norton v. Mathews, 427 U. S. 524, 529-531 (1976) ; Moor v. County of 
Alameda, 411 U. S. 693, 715 (1973); United States v. Augenblick, 393 
u. s. ::348, 351-352 (1969) . 
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II 
This is the first case in which this Court has been called 
upon to interpret § 504. It is elementary that "{t]he 
starting point in every case involving the construction of a 
statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring); see Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, . Inc., 437 
U. S. 322, 330 (1978); Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 
U. S. 462, 472 (1977). Section 504 by its terms does not 
compel educational institutions to disregard the disabilities 
of handicapped individuals or to make substantial modifica-
tions in their programs to allow disabled persons to partici-
pate. Instead, it requires only that an "otherwise qualified 
handicapped individual" not be excluded from participation 
in a federally funded program "solely by reason of his handi-
cap," indicating only that mere possession of a handicap is 
not a permissible ground for assuming an inability to function 
in a particular context.6 
6 The Act defines "handcapped individual" as follows: 
"The term 'handicapped individual' means any individual who (A) has a 
physical or mental disability which for such individual constitutes or re-
sults in a substantial handicap to employment and (B) can reasonably 
be expected to benefit in terms of employability from vocational rehabili-
ta tion services provided pursuant to subchapters I and III of this chapter. 
For the purposes of subchapters IV and V of t his chapter, such term 
means any person who (A) has a physical or mental impairment which 
substanially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (B)' 
has a record of such an impairment, or (C) is regarded as having such an 
impairment." Section 7 of t he Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 359, 
as amended, 88 Stat. 1619, 89 Stat. 2, 29 U. S. C. § 706 (6) . 
This definit ion comports with our understanding of § 504. A person who 
has a record of or is regarded as having an impairment may at present 
have no actual incapacity at all. Such a person would be exactly the 
kind of individual who could be "otherwise qualified" to participate in 
covered programs. And a person who suffers from a. limiting physical or 
mental impairment still may possess other abilities that permit him to meet 
the requirements of various programs. Thus it is clear that Congress 
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The court below, however, believed that the "otherwise 
qualified" persons protected by § 504 include those who would 
be able to meet the requirements of a particular program in 
every respect except as to limitations imposed by their handi-
cap. See 574 F. 2d, at 1160. Taken literally, this holding 
would prevent an institution from taking into account any 
limitation resulting from the handicap, however disabling. 
It assumes, in effect, that a person need not meet legitimate 
physical requirements in order to be "otherwise qualified." 
We think the understanding of the District Court is closer 
to the plain meaning of the statutory language. An otherwise 
qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's 
requirements in spite of his handicap. 
The regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) to interpret § 504 reinforce, 
rather than contradict, this conclusion. According to these 
regulations, a "[q]ualified handicapped person" is, "[w]ith 
respect to postsecondary and vocational education services, a 
handicapped person who meets the academic and technical 
standards requisite to admission or participation in the 
{school's] education program or activity ... . " 45 CFR 
§ 84.3 (k) (3) (1978). An explanatory note states: 
"The term 'technical standards' refers to all nonacademic 
admissions criteria that are essential to participation in 
the program in question." 45 CFR pt. 84, App. A, at p. 
405 (emphasis supplied). 
A further note emphasizes that legitimate physical qualifica-
tions may be essential to participation in particular programs.' 
included among the class of "handicapped" persons covered by § 504 a 
range of individuals who could be "otherwise qualified." See S. Rep. No. 
1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess ., 38---39 (1974) . 
7 The note states: 
"Paragraph (k) of § 84.3 defines the term 'qualified handicapped person.' 
Throughout the regulation, this term is used instead of the statutory term 
·'otherwise qualified handicapped person:' The Department believes that 
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We think it clear, therefore, that HEW interprets the "other" 
qualifications which a handicapped person may be required to 
meet as including necessary physical qualifications. 
III 
The remaining question is whether the physical qualifica-
tions Southeastern dema.nded of respondent might not · be 
necessary for participation in its nursing program. It is not 
open to dispute that, as Southeastern's Associate Degree 
Nursing program currently is constituted, the ability to under-
stand speech without reliance on lipreading is necessary for 
patient safety during the clinical phase of the program. As 
the District Court found, this ability also is indispensable for 
many of the functions that a registered nurse performs. 
Respondent contends nevertheless that§ 504, properly inter-
preted, compels Southeastern to undertake affirmative action 
that would dispense with the need for effective oral communi-
cation. First, it is suggested that respondent can be given 
individual supervision by faculty members whenever she at-
tends patients directly. Moreover, certain required courses 
might be dispensed with altogether for respondent. It is not 
necessary, she argues, that Southeastern train her to undertake 
all the tasks a registered nurse is licensed to perform. Rather, 
it is sufficient to make § 504 applicable if respondent might 
· be able to perform satisfactorily some of the duties of a regis-
the omission of the word 'otherwise' is necessary in order to comport with 
the intent of the statute because, read literally, 'otherwise' qualified handi-
capped persons include persons who are qualified except for their handicap, 
rather than in spite of their handicap. Under such a literal reading, a 
blind person possessing all t he qualifications for driving a bus except sight 
could be said to be 'otherwise qualified' for the job of driving. Clearly, 
such a Tesult was not intended by Congress. In all other respects, the 
terms 'qualified' and 'otherwise qualified' are intended to be interchange-
able." 45 CFR pt. 84, App. A, at p . 405. 
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tered nurse or to hold some of the positions availa,ble to a 
registered nurse. 8 
Respondent finds support for this argument in portions of 
the HEW regulations discussed above. In particular, a provi-
sion a:pplicable to postsecondary educational programs requires 
covered institutions to make "modifications" in their programs 
to accommodate handicapped persons, and to provide "auxil-
iary aids" such as sign-language interpreters.9 Respondent 
8 The court below adopted a portion of this nrgument: 
"[Respondent's] ability to read lips aids her in overcoming her hearing 
disability; however, it was argued that in certain situations such as in 
an operating room environment where surgical masks are used, this ability 
would be unavailing to her. 
"Be that as it may, in the medical community, there does appear to be a 
number of settings in which the plaintiff could perform satisfactorily as an 
RN, such as in industry or perhaps a physician's office. Certainly [re-
spondent.] could be viewed as possessing extraordinary insight into the 
medical and emotional needs of those with hearing disabilities. 
"If [respondent] meets all the other criteria for admission in the pursuit 
of her RN career, under the relevant North Carolina statutes, N. C. Gen. 
Stat. §§ 90-158, et seq., it should not be foreclosed to her simply because 
she may not be able to function effectively in all the roles which registered 
nurses may choose for their careers." 574 F . 2d 1158, 1161 n. 6 (CA4 
1978) . 
9 This regulation provides in full : 
"(a) Academic requirements. A recipient [ of federal funds] to which 
this subpart applies shall make such modifications to its academic require-
ments as are necessary to ensure that such requirements do not discrimi-
nate or have the effect of discriminating, on the basis of handicap, against 
a qualified handicapped applicant or student. Academic requirements that 
the recipient can demonstrate are essential to the program of instruction 
being pursued by such student or to any directly related licensing require-
ment will not be regarded as discriminatory within the meaning of this 
section. Modifications may include changes in the length of time per-
mitted for the completion of degree requirements, substitution of specific 
courses required for the completion of degree requirements, and adapta-
tion of the manner in which specific courses are conducted. 
" (d) Auxiliary aids. (1) A recipient to which this subpart applies shall 
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argues that this regulation imposes an obligation to ensure full 
participation in covered programs by handicapped individuals 
and, in particular, requires Southeastern to make the kind of 
adjustments that would be necessary to permit her safe 
participation in the nursing program. 
We note first that on the present record it appears unlikely 
respondent could benefit from any affirmative action that the 
regulation reasonably could be interpreted as requiring. Sec-
tion 84.44 ( d) (2), for example, explicitly excludes "devices or 
services of a personal nature" from the kinds of auxiliary aids 
a school must provide a handicapped individual. Yet the only 
evidence in the record indicates that nothing less than close, 
individual attention by a nursing instructor would be sufficient 
to ensure patient safety if respondent took part in the clinical 
phase of the nursing program. See 424 F. Supp., at 1346. 
Furthermore, it also is reasonably clear that § 84.44 (a) does 
not encompass the kind of curricular changes that would be 
necessary to accommodate respondent in the nursing program. 
In light of respondent's inability to function in clinical courses 
without close supervision, Southeastern with prudence could 
allow her to take only academic classes. Whatever benefits 
respondent might realize from such a course of study, she 
would not receive even a rough equivalent of the training a 
nursing program normally gives. Such a fundamental altera-
ta.ke such steps as are necessary to ensure that no handicapped student is 
denied the benefits of, excluded from participation in , or otherwise sub-
jected to discrimination under the education program or activity operated 
by the recipient because of the absence of educational auxiliary aids for 
students with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills. 
" (2) Auxiliary aids mar include taped texts, interpreters or other 
effective methods of making orally delivered materials available to stu-
dents with hearing impairments, readers in libraries for students with 
visual impairments, classroom equipment adapted for use by students with 
manual impairments, and other similar services and actions. - Recipients 
need not provide attendants, individually presc ribed devices, readers for 
personal use or study, or other devices or services of a personal nature." 
%~§~ . 
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tion in the nature of a program is far more than the "modifica-
tion" the regulation requires. 
Moreover, an interpretation of the regulations that required 
the extensive modifications necessary to include respondent in 
the nursing program would raise grave doubts about their 
validity. If these regulations were to require substantial ad-
justments in existing programs beyond those necessary to elim-
inate discrimination against otherwise qualified individuals, 
they would do more than clarify the meaning of § 504. In-
stead, they would constitute an unauthorized extension of the 
obligations imposed by that statute. 
The language and structure of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 reflect a recognition by Congress of the distinction be-', 
tween the evenhanded treatment of qualified handicapped 
persons and affirmative efforts to overcome the disabilities 
caused by handicaps. Section 501 (b), governing the employ-
ment of handicapped individuals by the Federal Government, 
requires each federal agency to submit "an affirmative action 
program plan for the hiring, placement, and advancement of 
handicapped individuals . . .. " These plans "shall include 
a description of the extent to which and methods whereby the 
special needs of handicapped employees are being met." 
Similarly, § 503 (a) , governing hiring by federal contractors, 
requires employers to "take affirmative action to employ and 
advance in employment qualified handicapped individ-
uals .... " The President is required to promulgate regula-
tions to enforce this section. 
Under § 501 (c) of the Act, by contrast, state agencies such 
as Southeastern are only "encourage[d] .. . to adopt such 
policies and procedures." Section 504 does not refer at all to 
affirmative action ; and except as it applies to federal em-
ployers it does not provide for implementation by administra-
tive action. A comparison of these provisions demonstrates 
that Congress understood accommodation of the needs of 
handicapped individuals may require affirmative action .and 
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knew how to provide for it in those instances where it wished 
to do so.10 
Although an agency's interpretation of the statute under 
which is operates is entitled to some deference, "this deference 
is constrained by our obligation to honor the clear meaning 
of a statute, as revealed by its language, purpose and history." 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 
-, - n. 20 (1979) . Here neither the language, purpose, 
nor history of § 504 reveals an intent to impose an affirmative 
action obligation on all recipients of federal funds.11 Accord-
10 Section 115 (a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1978 added to the 1973 
Act a section authorizing grants to state units for the purpose of provid-
ing "such information and technical assistance (including support per-
sonnel such as interpreters for the deaf) as may be necessary to assist 
those entities in complying with this Act, particularly the requirements of 
section 504." 92 Stat. 2971, codified at 29 U.S. C. § 775. This provision 
recognizes that on occasion the elimination of discrimination might involve 
some costs; it does not imply that the rPfusal to undertake substantial 
changes in a program by itself constitutes discrimination. Whatever effect 
the availability of these funds might have on ascertaining the existence of 
discrimination in some future case, no such ftmds were available to South-
eastern at the time respondent sought admission to its nursing program. 
11 The Government, in a brief amicus curiae in support of respondent, 
cites a report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on 
the 1974 amendments to the 1973 Act and several statements by individual 
Members of Congress during debate on the 1978 amendments, some of 
which indicate a belief that § 504 requires affirmative action. See Brief 
for the Government as Amicus Curiae 44-50. But these isolated state-
ments by individual Members of Congress or its committees, all made 
after the enactment of the statute under consideration, cannot substitute 
for a clear expression of legislative intent a.t the time of enadment. 
Quern v. Mandley, 436 U. S. 725, 736 n. 10 (1978); Los Angeles Dept. of 
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 714 (1978). Nor do these 
comments, none of which represents the will of Congress as a whole, con-
stitute subsequent "legislation" such as this Court might weigh in con-
struing the meaning of an earlier enactment. Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting 
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-381 (1969) . 
The Government also argues that various amendments to the 1973 Act 
. contained in the Rehabilitation Act of 1978 further reflect Congress' ap-
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ingly, we hold that even if HEW has attempted to create such 
an obligation itself, it lacks the authority to do so. 
IV 
We do not suggest that the line between a lawful refusal 
to extend affirmative action and illegal discrimination against 
handicapped persons always will be clear. It is possible to 
envision situations where an insistence on continuing past 
requirements and practices might arbitrarily deprive genuinely 
qualified handicapped persons of the opportunity to partici-
pate in a covered program. Technological advances can be 
expected to enhance opportunities to rehabilitate the handi-
capped or otherwise to qualify them for some useful employ-
ment. Such advances also may enable attainment of these 
goals without imposing undue financial and administrative 
burdens upon a State. Thus situations may arise where a 
refusal to modify an existing program might become unrea-
sonable and discriminatory. Identification of those instances 
where a refusal to accommodate the needs of a disabled person 
amounts to discrimination against the handicapped continues 
to be an important responsibility of HEW. 
proval of the affirmative action obligation created by HEW's regulations. 
But the amendment most directly on point undercuts t his position. In 
amending § 504, Congress both extended that section's prohibition of dis-
crimination to "any program or activity conducted by any Executive 
agency or by the United States Postal Service" and authorized administra-
tive regulations to implement only this amendment . See n. 2, supra. 
The fact that no other regulations were ment ioned supports an inference 
t hat no others were approved. 
Finally, we note that the assertion by HEW of the authority to promul-
gate any regulations under § 504 has been neither consistent nor long-
standing. For the first three years after t he sect ion was enacted, HEW 
maintained the position that Congress had not intended any regulations 
to be issued. It altered its stand only aft er having been enjoined to do 
so. See n. 4, supra. This fac t substantially diminishes the deference to 
be given to HEW's present interpretat ion of the statute. See Ge:nera!, 
E lectric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976) . 
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In this case, however. it is clear that Southeastern's unwill•' 
ingness to make major adjustments in its nursing program 
does not constitute such discrimination. The uncontroverted 
testimony of several members of Southeastern's staff and 
faculty established that the purpose of its program was to 
train persons who could serve the nursing profession in all 
customary ways. See, e. g., App. 35a, 52a, 53a, 71a, 74a. 
This type of purpose, far from reflecting any animus against 
handicapped individuals, is shared by many if not most of the 
institutions that train persons to render professional service. 
It is undisputed that respondent could not participate in 
Southeastern's nursing program unless the standards were 
substantially lowered. Section 504 imposes no requirement 
upon an educational institution to lower or to effect substan-
tial modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped 
person.12 
One may admire respondent's desire and determination to 
overcome her handicap, and there well may be various other 
types of service for which she can qualify. In this case, 
however, we hold that there was no violation of § 504 when 
Southeastern concluded that respondent did not qualify for 
12 Respondent contends that it is unclear whether North Carolina law 
requires a registered nurse to be capable of performing all functions open 
to that profession in order to obtain a license to practice, although McRee, 
the Executive Director of the state Board of Nursing, had informed South-
eastern that the law did so require. See App. 138a-139a. Respondent 
further argues that even if she is not capable of meeting North Carolina's 
present licensing requirements, she still might succeed in obtaining a license 
in another jurisdiction. 
Respondent's argument misses the point. Southeastern's program, struc-
tured to train persons who will be able to perform all normal roles of a 
registered nurse, represents a legitimate academic policy, and is accepted 
} 
by the State. In f'ffect it 8eeks to ensure th~L;, gr~dt~r ~SC 1 
danger to the public in an~, profes,,ional role • m1g 1 e cast. Even 
if the lieensing requirements of North Carolina or some other State are 
less demanding, nothing in the Act requires an educational institution to. 
lower its standards. 
l-i(.. (N sk 
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admission to its program. Nothing in the language or history 
of § 504 reflects an intention to limit the freedom of an educa-
tional institution to require reasonable physical qualifications 
for admission to a clinical training program. Nor has there 
been any showing in this case that any action short of a 
substantial change in Southeastern's program would render 
unreasonable the qualifications it imposed. 
V 
Accordingly, we reserve the judgment of the court below, 
and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
✓ v n( 
fl 
CHAMBERS OF 
j,u:punu QJtttttt itf tlr~ ~nittb ~taf.tg 
Jbt1dfut¢0tt. ~. QJ. 2llffe'!$ 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLAC K MUN June 8, 1979 
Re: No. 78 - 711 - Southeastern Community College v . Davis 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
Since;;x. 
• Wit • -111 
~ 
UN B \97~ •12. 20 
Page proof of syllabus as 
approved. 
- Lineup included. 
- Lineup still to be 
added. Plea:;c send 
lineup to Print Shop 
when n,vailablo a.nd 
~ copy to me. 
NOTE: Where 1t ts feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be re-
leased, as ls being done In connection with this case, at the time 
the opinion is Issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for 
the convenience of the reader. See United Statea v. Detroit Lumber 
Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337. 
l/4other copy of page proof of 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ){f;;= as approved to 
L ~;~eup, which hn,s now 
been added. Syllabus 
- Additional changes 
SOUTHEASTERN COMMUNITY COLLEGE v. DAV 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR Tl 
FOURTH CIRCUIT 
No. 78-711. Argued April 23, 1979-Decided June 11, 1979 
Resp:mdent, who suffers from a serious hearing disability and who seeks to 
be trained as a registered nurse, was denied admission to the nursing 
p :-ogram of petitioner Southeastern Community College, a state institu-
tion that receives fed eral funds. An audiologist's report indicated that 
enn with a hearing aid respondent cannot understand speech directed 
to her except through lipreading, and p etitioner rejected respondent's 
application for admission because it believed her hearing disability made 
it impossible for her to participate safely in the normal clinical training 
program or to care safely for patients. R espondent then filed suit 
against petitioner in Federal Distric t Court alleging, inter mia, a violation 
of § 504 of the R ehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits discrimination 
against an "otherwise qualified hand'capped individual" in federally 
funded programs "solely by reason of his handicap." The District 
Court entered judgment in favor of petitioner, confirming the audi-
ologist's findings and concluding that respondent's handicap prevented 
her from safely performing in both her training program and her pro-
posed profes3i::m. On this basis, the court held that respondent was not 
an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" protected by § 504 and 
that t-he decision to exclude her was not discriminatory within the mean-
ing of § 504. Although not disputing the D'strict Court's fact findings, 
the C:mrt of Appoals reve:-sed, holding that in light of intervening 
regulations of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW), § 504 required petitioner to reconsider respondent's application 
for ad:nission without regard to her hearing ability, and that in deter-
mining whether respondent was "otherwise qualified," petitioner must 
confine its inquiry to her "acade:nic and technical qualifications ." The 
Court of Appeals also suggested that § 504 required "affirmative conduct" 
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Held: There was no violation of § 504 when petitioner concluded that 
respondent did not qualify for admission to its program. Nothing in 
the language or history of § 504 limits the freedom of an educational 
institution to require reasonable physical qualifications for admission to 
a clinical training program. Nor has there been any showing in this 
case that any action short of a substantial change in petitioner's pro-
gram would render unreasonable the qualifications it imposed. Pp. 
6-15. 
(a) The terms of § 504 indicate that mere possession of a handicap is 
not a permissible ground for assuming an inability to function in a par-
ticular context, but do not mean that a person need not meet legitimate 
physical requirements in order to be "otherwise qualified." An other-
wise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's 
requirements in spite of his handicap. HEW's regulations reinforce, 
rather than contradict, this conclusion. Pp. 6-8. 
(b) Section 504 does not compel petitioner to undertake affirmative 
action that would dispense with the need for effective oral communi.-
cation, such as by giving respondent individual supervision whenever 
she attends patients directly or by dispensing with certain required 
courses for respondent and training her to perform some but not all of 
the tasks a registered nurse is licensed to perform. Oh the record it 
appears unlikely that respondent could benefit from any affirmative action 
that HEW regulations reasonably could be interpreted as requiring with 
regard to "modifications" of postsecondary educational programs to 
accommodate handicapped persons and the provision of "auxiliary aids" 
such as sign-language interpreters. Moreover, an interpretation of the 
regulations that required the extensive modifications necessary to in-
clude respondent in the nursing program would raise grave doubts about 
their validity. Neither the language, purpose, nor history of § 504 
reveals an intent to impose an affirmative action obligation on all re-
cipients of federal funds, and thus even if HEW has attempted to create 
such an obligation itself, it lacks the authority to do so. Pp. 8-13. 
( c) The line between a lawful refusal to extend affirmative action and 
illegal discrimination against handicapped persons will not always be 
clear, and situations may arise where a refusal to modify an existing 
program to accommodate the needs of a disabled person amounts to 
discrimination against the handicapped. In this case, however, peti-
tioner's unwillingness to make major adjustments in its nursing program 
does not constitute such discrimination. Uncontroverted testimony 
esablished that the purpose of petitioner's program was to train persons 
who could serve the nursing profession in all customary ways, and this 
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type of purpose, far from reflecting any animus against handicapped 
individuals, is shared by many if not most of the institutions that train 
:{lersons to render professional service. Section 504 imposes no require-
ment upon an educational institution to lower or to effect substantial 
modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped person. 
Pp. 13-14. 
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POWELL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
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ORAL STATEMENT - June 11, 1979 
Respondent in this case suffers from a substantial 
hearing/ disability. She nevertheles3/sought to be trained / as 
a registered nurse,/ and applied to the nursing program of 
Southeastern Commu~ity College. She was rejected/ on the 
ground that her disability would prevent her from 
participatino/in the clinical part of the program/ and could 
pose a danger to her patients in the future. 
She brought suit in federal court / claiming that 
Southeastern had discriminated against he( on the basis of 
her handicao/in violation of§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act/ 
of 1973. This statute forbids recipients~ f federal funds/ 
from discriminating against/ an "otherwise qualified 
handicapped individual ••• solely on the basis of his 
handicap." -~ 
The District Court found for Southeastern,\ It held :f' 
that respondent was ~t an "otherwise qualified" person / 
within the meaning of§ 504. It found that sh~ was not able 
to meet the prescribed physical qualifications. 




The Fourth Circuit reversed / holding that§ 504 
required Southeastern to pass on respondent's application/ 
without considering her physical disabilities. It further 
suggested that this statute required Southeastern/ to 
undertake affirmative steps/to modify its program to enable 
persons such as respondent to participate. 
We disagree with the 6'ourt of Appeals. 
We think it clear/ that Congress intended to 
prohibit discrimination/ ~ Y against persons who are 
qualified for particular work in spite of th 
cannot accept the argument/ that a ~unctionally deaf per§on 
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Nor do we find any indication in the language or 
history of Section 504/ that Congress intended to require a 
college receiving federal funds,/ to lower or substantially 
modify its standards/ to accommodate the special needs of~~ 
handicapped individuals. Section 504, in this respect, is to 
be contrasted to other provisions of the Rehabilitation Act ( 
applicable in other situations / that do require affirmative 
action of this kind. u-,A~-·~~ 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
June 12, 1979 
Case Held for No. 78-711: Southeastern Community College v. 
Davis 
Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation -center, Inc., No. 78-1454 
Recommendation: Deny 
Petitioner, a registered nurse, was discharged from a 
privately operated nursing home after State health officials 
called attention to her deteriorating vision. She sued her 
employer under§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The 
district court dismissed, holding that§ 504 did not provide a 
cause of action for private suits and that the nursing home was 
not covered by the Act, inasmuch as the only federal funds it 
received were in the form of reimbursement for patient charges. 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, deciding only that in light of the 
1978 amendments of the 1973 Act, a private right of action was 
limited to instances where providing employment was the primary 
objective of the federal aid involved or where discrimination in 
employment necessarily caused discrimination against the primary 
beneficiaries of the federal aid. 
We did not pass on the implied cause of action issue in 
Davis. As this case does not involve state action, the question 
whether§ 1983 might provide an alternative source for the cause 
of action, which we also avoided in Davis, is not presented 
here. It is noteworthy that two members of the panel of the 
court below were members of the Davis panel, including the 
author of that opinion. The 1978 amendments, which had not been 
enacted at the time Davis was decided, addressed the cause of 
action issue, and the court below reappraised and limited its 
previous holding in light of them. The court's construction of 
these amendments seems reasonable, and there is no conflict. 
Accordi ~gly, I recommend that we deny the petition. 
~.r.tP. 
L. F. P. , Jr. 
DEAF ST°UDENT LOSES 
HIGH COURT. APPEAL 
Justices Rule Rehabilitation Act 
. Does Not Force College E~try . , . "· .... 
By LINDA GREENHOUSE 
Special to The New York Times 
WASHINGTON, June 11 _:_ The Su-
preme Court ruled unanimously today 
that Federal Jaw does not require a co\-
. Jege either to accept a student whose ~ 
handicap prevents him from meeting the I 
requirements of a particular program or 
to provide " extensive modificat_io_ns" 
that would make the student's part1c1pa-
tion physically possible. 
The decision was the Court's first rul-
ing on the scope of the six-year-0Jd law 
that prohibits discrimination against the 
handicapped. It is a setback for both the 
F ederal Government and for the recently 
organized groups of handicapped individ-
uals whose efforts culminated in passage 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1913. 
In another case the Court agreed today 
to decide if New York State's latest at-
tempt to provide state aid to parochial 
schools is constitutional. [Page Bl.] 
The Justices unanimously overturned 
the obscenity conviction of an adult book 
store owner in New Hampton, Orange 
County, N.Y., be<;huse of an "open-
ended" warrant that the High Court said 
Jed to an unconstitutional search of the 
store. [Page Dl9.) 
The decision on the handicapped stu-
Contloued on Page D19, Column 1 
~r~-"~ b ~ o~~~~~ -e_ . \; 
Handicapped Lose Suit on College 
Continued From Page Al 
~ ..... -·- --· ....,_,.. ____ .. . -----· ~ the Fourth Circuit _reversed, ruling _that _§ection 50-4 requires an institution to ex-
dent, Southeastern Community College v. amine an applicant's qualifications with-
Davis (No. 76-711), reverses a ruling of a out regard to any handicap. Further, the 
Fe<lernl appei!Js court, whlc.h ~\u tnat court said, Section 504 requires. "affittna-
the North Carolina college could not tive con<luct" to enable the handicapp,:'d 
refuse to admit a deaf woman to its nu.rs- to pa rticipate fully" even when such 
m odifications become expensive." 
ing program solely because of her handi-
ca p. ·The lower court had further indi- The Supreme Court , in an opinion by 
cated that the college was obliged to aive Associate J ustice Lewis F. Powell Jr., 
.,, agreed with the tri::il court. "An other-
the woman, Frances B. Davis, specia l wise qualified person is one who is able to 
helptocompensa tefor herdisability. m eet all of a program's requirements in l 
At issue in the case was Section 504 of spite of his handicap," the opinion said . 
the Rehabilitation Act, which provides The physical qualifications , Justice 
that "no otherwise qualified handicapped Powell said, had to be legitimate ones. In 
individual" ·can be ei:ccJU<,led "solely by this case, he said, "it is not open to dis-
r eason of his han'dicap" from participa- pute tha t, as Southeastern's associate de-
tion in any program rece iving Federal gree nursing program currently Is consti-
tuted, the ability to understand speech 
funds. ' :i · without reliance on lip reading is neces-
The trial court, interpreting this Jan- sary for patient safety." 
guage. to apply to persons who would be The High Court also rejected the sec-
qualified "in spite of the handicap," ruled ond part . of the appeals court's conclu-
in favor of the college. Mrs. Davis was sion. "Neithe r the language, pu.rpose, nor 
not an "otherwise qua lified handicapped history of Section 504 reveals an intent to 
individual," the court said, because her impose an affirmative action obligation 
dependence on lip-reading would prevent on all recipients of Federal funds," Jus-
her from functioning "sufficiently" as a tice Powell wrote. 
nursing student or registered nurse. "It is undisputed," he said, that Mrs. 
=Th=e=U=n=it=ed=S=t=a=te=s=C=o=u=rt=of=A=p=pe=a=ls=f=o=rl Davis "could not participate in South-
eastern 's nursing program unless the 
Samuel L. S~yder, 9 7; · 
Plu~bing Concern Head 
/ standards were substantially lowered. 
Section 504 imposes no requirement upon 
an educational institution to lower or to 
affect substantial modifications of stand-
ards to accomodate a handicapped per-
. Samuel L • .' Snydet believed to be. the son." 
oldest licensed plumber in New York Doubts About the Ruling 
State, died Sunday at his borne in Yon- Despite this apparently unambiguous 
kers. He was 97 years old. language, however, other portions of 
Mr. Snyder was honorary chairman of opinion leave open to question exactly 
the board of the Snyder Plumbing and how sweeping today's ruling is. 
He.a ting Corporation, which he founded in Justice Powell left open the possibility 
1906. He was a contractor on many state that, when modifications to accomodate 
and municipal projects, including the the handicapped can be made "without 
New York City Department of Health; imposing undue financial and adminis-
'he Willowbrook State Hospital on Staten trative burdens," there would be situa-
·land; the Pilgrim State Hospital, in tions "where a refusal to modify an exist-
, ntwood, L.I.; the Harlem Valley State ing program might become unreasonable 
1ital, in Wingdale; and the Rockland - and discrimina tory." 
B:ospital, in Orangeburg. "We do not suggest," the opinion said, 
1nkers, his home for more than 61 "that the line between a lawful refusal to 
1 
·r. Snyder's projects included the extend affirmative action and illegal dis-
e Junior High School. crimination against handicapped persons 
1er was president of the Park always will be clear." 
•s Association in Yonkers. Justice Powell said that the drawing of 
red by his wife, the former such a line "continues to be an important 
: · two sons, E . Walter of responsibility" of the Department of 
,nd Robert of Rye, N.Y., Health, Education and Welfare. The de-
-s, Joan S. Surnamer of partment administers the law and has 
'aine S. Tobias of Car- issued regulations requiring educational 
le is.also survived by institutions to provide "auxiliary aids" 
· for handicapped students. 
======= There is also language in the opinion 
suggesting that today's holding can be 
confined to professional training pro-
grams with particular physical require-
' ments, as opposed to general liberal arts 1 
programs . . The opinJon also appears to 
apply only to educational institutions, 
rather than to the array of social services 
also covered by Section 504. The 15- e 
o i ·on was unusual 
re at1ve y une~or suhject 
Ifie Jushce75epartment had entered 
thecase on behalf of Mrs. Davis, arguing 
that Section 504 implicitly requires insti-
tutions to "try to find a way" for handi-
capped persons to participate in federal-
ly-funded programs. 
Despite her deafness, Mrs. Davis had 
· been a licensed practical nurse for 11 
years and had completed the academic 
-requirements for the registered nursing 
program when the college refused to 
admit hef to the portion of the program 
that requi res conta~t with patients . 
i~irl)ltto11~ [:i1nrs-Disµutrh 
JOit'\ STEW \RT RR, A\.111, P11h/i.,lwr 
JOH, E. LEAR!). f:xPruti,·,, falitor 
.\LF (;()01), 1\00'\Tl . .'1111111,:in,: f :,litor 
EOW .\HD GH"bLE,. f :,litor of th,• f .,litorial l'n;:.•• 
Thursday, June 21, 1979 
Necessary Realism 
The United States Supreme Court 
i nj ec ted a useful measure of real ism 
last week into an emerging national 
ideal. 
The ideal is that handicapped per-
sons ought fo have access to tne 
education and employment that will 
enable them to realize their full 
potential and be productive, con-
tributing ciyzens . 
The realistic note added by a sur-
prisingly unanimous Supreme Court 
was thatoccasionallytherearevalid 
limits to the extent that institutions 
must take " affirmative action" to 
respond to the desires of the handi-
capped . 
At issue was the refusal of the 
Southeastern Community College in 
Whiteville, N. C., to admit Frances 
B. Davis to its nursing degree 
program leading to an associate 
( two-year) degree. The college 
argued that in order to accom-
modate Mrs. Davis , who has a 
severe hearing impairment, it would 
have to lower its training standards 
and furnish expensive supplemen-
tary services just for her. Citing the 
1973 federal Rehabilitation Act and 
its requirement that " no otherwise 
q~alified handicapped individual" 
can be excluded from a federally aid-
ed program "solely by reason of his 
handicap," Mrs. Davis contended 
that only her deafness made her in-
eligible for the training and that she 
was " otherwise qualified." 
A federal district court ruled 
against her, but the 4th U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed that 
decision, holding that regulations of 
the Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare required the 
college to disregard totally Mrs. 
Davis' hearing handicap and take 
in to account only her' ' academic and 
technical qualifications" in deciding 
if she was "otherwise qualified." 
In essence, the appeals court 
defined an "otherwise qualified" 
person as one able to meet all 
program requirements e:rcept as to 
limitations imposed by his or her 
handicap. But in reversing that 
judgment, the nine justices of the 
Supreme Court-in an opinion 
written by Justice Lewis F . Powell 
J r.-declared that an "otherwise 
qualified" person is "one who is able 
to meet all of a program's re-
quirements in spite of his handi-
cap." (Italics ours.) 
Taken literally, the appeals 
court's interpretation would have 
prevented an institution "from tak-
ing into account any limitation 
resulting from the handicap, 
however disabling," Justice Powell 
wrote. 
Safety is one factor in a legitimate 
need to be able to consider an 
applicant's physical qualifications. 
Mrs. Davis depends totally on 
lipreading for communicating with 
others. In the college's clinical train-
ing for nurses, patients could have 
been endangered by her inability to 
detect words not spoken directly at 
her, it was pointed out. 
The Raleigh News and Observer, 
which editorially concurred with the 
Powell opinion on the controversy 
arising in its state, added this last-
paragraph caveat: 
"It would be unfortunate if schools 
and colleges were to react to [last 
week's] decision by curtailing 
programs to assist handicapped 
students. It's all too easy for 
bureaucrats to justify inhumanity 
by appealing to standards of cost-
effectiveness and efficiency. But a 
sweeping demand that no handicap 
constitute an obstacle to any act:vi ty 
would have been based on fantasy." 
Fortunately, Justice Powell 
addressed the potential problem 
identified by the N&O. Situations 
may arise, he wrote, "where an in-
sts tence on continuing past .re-
quirements and practices might ar-
bitrarily deprive genuinely qualified 
handicapped persons of the oppor-
tunity to participate in a covered 
program." Advances in rehabilita-
tion may make possible attainment 
of specific goals of handicapped in-
dividuals "without imposing undue 
financial and administrative bur-
dens upon a state." In such cases, 
refusal to modify a program might 
become "unreasonable and dis-
criminatory," said Mr. Powell. 
Thus, the decision gives in-
stitutions no carte bl,anche to dis-
criminate against persons who are 
struggling to overcome their handi-
caps. And that is as it should be. 
